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How
the New
European Union
Constitution Will Allocate
Power
Between the EU and Its Member
States-A Textual Analysis
Stephen C. Sieberson*
ABSTRACT

The new European Union Constitution, if ratified by the
EU's Member States, will replace the existing EC Treaty and
Treaty on European Union. The Author analyzes the text of the
Constitution to determine how it balances the functions and
powers of the EU institutions with the role of the Member State
governments within the EU system. Topic areas include the
characteristicsof the EU, the Union's values and objectives, and
the substantive areas of EU activity. In each area the
Constitution reveals a determined effort by its drafters to
emphasize the correspondingcharacteristics,values, and powers
of the Member States. The Author's conclusion is that the
treaties'delicate balance between the competences of the EU and
the states has been attentively maintainedin the Constitution.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORIES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION

The Member States of the European Union (EU or Union) are
now considering the ratification of a constitution (the Constitution)
approved by the Intergovernmental Conference in June 2004.1 The
new instrument is intended to replace the two treaties currently
serving as the EU's primary constituent documents, the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (EC Treaty) and
2
the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
The focus of this Article is to review the Constitution to
determine how it will distribute power within the EU. The balance of
power has been the subject of debate throughout the EU's history, a
debate stimulated by questions such as: What institutions and
procedures are necessary to ensure that the EU reaches its potential?
In an expanding Union, how should the common market be managed?
At what level of government should social policy be determined? How

* Fulbright Visiting Professor in International and Comparative Law, Institute of
International Relations and Approximation of Law, Faculty of Law, Comenius
University, Bratislava, Slovak Republic. Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Oregon School of Law.
1.
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, CIG 87/04 (Aug. 6,
2004) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION]. The IGC approved a revised version of the draft
produced by the European Convention on July 18, 2003, O.J. (C 169) 1 (2003).
2.
Id. at art. IV-437. The treaties are: TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1957) and TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION (MAASTRICHT), Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992), each of which has
been amended to its most current version by the TREATY OF NICE AMENDING TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND
CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) (2001) [the treaties in their current
versions are respectively referred to hereinafter as EC TREATY and TEU]. The
European Union is the latest name for the organization that has been known as the
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, the
European Economic Community, and the European Community. Although it is
currently appropriate to refer to the European Community in relation to much of the
body's activity, the name European Union is now in general use. Under the new
Constitution, the European Union will legally succeed the European Community, and
the term European Union will be used exclusively. CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art.
IV-438. For convenience, this Article will simply refer to the entity as the European
Union, the EU, or the Union.
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should foreign affairs and defense be conducted? How much
integration is necessary?
At the heart of the discussion lies the relationship between the
Union and its Member States, and in particular, where the
institutional power should reside. The discourse has revealed serious
differences of opinion as to how the EU should be organized and how
it should operate, because the structure and competences granted to
the Union will necessarily tip the scales toward centralized authority
in Brussels or away from the center and toward the national
governments. The debate has produced three principal schools of
3
thought regarding the EU:
1. Intergovernmental. Many politicians and observers believe
that the European Union is and must remain a treaty-based
organization, with the Member States retaining their essential
sovereignty as nations. The Union's powers must be carefully
contained, and ultimate authority must remain at the national level.
The EU must function as an intergovernmental organization (IGO),
albeit a highly sophisticated one.
2. Federal. European federalists insist that the EU is evolving
from its intergovernmental roots into a federation. For the Union to
prosper and assume its rightful place as a major economic and
political force in the world, further centralization is necessary, and
the process of integration must inevitably create a "United States of
Europe." National and cultural identity may be maintained, but
substantial or ultimate political authority must shift to the Union.
For the sake of efficiency and fairness, EU institutions must operate
on majoritarian principles.
3. Hybrid or Confederal. A centrist position is espoused by those
who assert that the EU has moved well beyond the IGO model but
that it need not aspire to become a federation. Possessing both
interstate and intrastate elements, the Union exists as a unique
hybrid, a confederation of sorts. 4 The EU is successful at
consolidating activities such as the internal market, where
centralization is advantageous. However, in many areas it makes

3.
For a more detailed description of the three theories, see Stephen
Sieberson, The Proposed European Union Constitution-Will it Eliminate the EU's
DemocraticDeficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 180-88 (2004).
4.
The blending of interstate and intrastate elements into a confederal system
is well-described in Murray Forsyth's notable 1981 treatise. MURRAY FORSYTH, UNIONS
OF STATES 10-16 (1981). Kalypso Nicolaidis describes the EU as "neither simply a
Union of democracies [described in this Article as the IGO model] nor a Union as
democracy [described in this Article as the federal model]," but a "third way,"
manifested as a "demoi-cracy" comprised of many peoples and their various states.
Kalypso Nicolaidis, The New Constitution as EuropeanDem oi-cracy?, FEDERAL TRUST
ONLINE PAPER No. 38/03, at 5 (Dec. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/
constitution/38_03.pdf.
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more sense to recognize the diversity of Europe and reserve authority
to the separate Member States.
Although form often follows function in architecture, the very
ability of the EU to function depends upon the form it is given. Of
critical importance are the competences granted to its institutions
and the interface between those institutions and the Member State
governments. The new Constitution is the culmination of the most
recent debates on these matters. 5 This Article will analyze the text of
the Constitution to determine how it articulates the newest version of
allocation of power between the Union and its members.

II. ANALYZING

THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution is divided into four parts. Part I, which is
untitled, broadly defines the Union, its competences, and its
institutions. Part II is captioned "The Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the Union," and it sets forth the Charter that had previously been
adopted as a "solemn proclamation" of the EU but was not included in
the treaties. 6 Part III, the longest section, is titled "The Policies and
Functioning of the Union." It incorporates much of the EC Treaty
and TEU, with considerable detail on internal market, social,
economic, and monetary policy; external action; and the activities of
the EU institutions. Part IV contains "General and Final Provisions"
and is followed by various protocols and declarations.

5.
The Intergovernmental Conference at Nice in 2001 called for a "deeper and
wider debate about the future of the European Union" including "how to establish and
monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the
Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity." Declaration on the Future of
the Union, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 85. That same year the Commission issued its White Paper
on European Governance, calling for a wide-ranging evaluation of the EU's mission and
its methods. Among the many concerns addressed, the White Paper asserted: "The
Union needs clear principles identifying how competence is shared between
the Union and its Member States." European Governance: White Paper from the
Commission to the European Council, EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 428) 34 (2001)
[hereinafter White Paper]. Near the end of 2001 the European Council issued the
'Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union," which mandated the
European Convention that convened in February 2002 and produced the Draft
Constitution in July 2003. Among the challenges facing the EU, the Declaration
stressed the need to "clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between
the Union and the Member States in light of the new challenges facing the Union."
European Council, The Future of the European Union - Laeken Declaration (Dec. 15,
2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/futurumi/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm.
6.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1, 5 (2000). For an analysis of the Charter and its background, see Giorgio Sacerdoti,
The European Charter of Fundamental Rights: From a Nation-State Europe to a
Citizens' Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 37 (2002) (arguing that the charter will help to
clarify European values, will serve as a foretaste of the European constitution, and will
strengthen the unity of Europeans as to fundamental rights).
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This analysis of the Constitution is organized into categories that
are intended to illustrate critical aspects of the relationship between
the Union and its Member States. First, certain key characteristics
of the EU are examined, including its state-like attributes and the
mandate and independence of its institutions. Second, the stated
values and objectives of the Union are described, with special
attention paid to protection of human rights. Third, there is a review
of provisions that assign substantive authority to the EU based on a
number of stated or implied principles underlying Union action.
Finally, the analysis focuses on five exceptional articles that
underscore the Union's continuing commitment to Member State
sovereignty.
It should be noted that this Article is focused primarily on the
textual content of the Constitution. It is beyond the scope of this
analysis to conduct a detailed comparison of the Constitution's
provisions with their counterparts in the treaties. Likewise, it will be
7
left to others to evaluate the legislative history of the document.
Comments in this Article on the substantive merits of the
Constitution are for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to
be comprehensive.
The text of this Article will be set out in point/counterpoint
fashion. In general, matters of EU authority will be described first,
followed by contrasting comments related to the power reserved to
the Member States. For illustrative purposes, descriptions of EU
competence will be given in Roman type, and their counterparts
printed in italics.
Comment on unanimous voting. The Constitution prescribes that
many decisions at the EU level will be adopted only by unanimous
vote, also described as consensus or common accord, either of the
European Council or Council of Ministers.8 Each of these instances
affords each Member State the opportunity to block a decision,9 and
the veto represents a substantial reservation of power to the Member
States. To avoid repetition, the implications of unanimous voting will

7.
An excellent narrative account of the Convention has been written by Peter
Norman. He provides invaluable detail about the mechanics of drafting the
Constitution and the politics of negotiating its more controversial provisions. PETER
NORMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION-THE STORY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

(2003).
In the Constitution, the European Council is always referred to with its full
8.
name, while in all provisions after Article 1-19 the Council of Ministers is referred to as
the "Council," and the European Commission is referred to as the "Commission." See
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-19(1). This Article will generally follow those
usage conventions.
9.
In its 2001 White Paper on European Governance, the Commission
observed: "The requirement for consensus in the European Council often holds policymaking hostage to national interests in areas which Council could and should decide by
a majority of Member States." White Paper, supra note 5, at 29.
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not be mentioned in each instance that this Article refers to such a
requirement in the Constitution.
A. Characteristicsof the EU
The European Union has been endowed with a number of
characteristics that demonstrate its autonomy as a governmental
entity. These include certain attributes that resemble those of
modern nation-states. In addition, the EU is composed of official
bodies that are similar to those found in a typical national
government. However, a closer look reveals a variety of carefully
crafted limitations on the Union and its institutions.
1. Basic State-Like Attributes
Independent existence: integrity. The European Union is an
entity created by, but existing apart from, the Member States. It is
established by the Constitution,' which declares that "[t]he Union
shall have legal personality." "1 Within the territory of the Member
States, the EU is allowed "such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the performance of its tasks." 12 The Union is also
granted "the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons"
under the laws of the states, and in particular, the rights to own
13
property and to be a party to legal proceedings.
The Constitution provides the EU with the typical symbols of
nationhood such as a flag, an anthem, a motto, and an annual
14
holiday, as well as a Union currency, the euro.
The EU is to consist of "an institutional framework" and a
specific set of institutions 15 whose carefully delineated powers and
responsibilities
comprise
a
significant percentage
of the
Constitution's text. The institutions are empowered to create law for
the Union in its variety of forms, and much of the EU's regulatory
activity is to be carried out at the central, EU level. 16 The activities of

10.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. I-1.
11.
Id. at art. 1-7. The EU had not been granted legal personality under the
TEU, although the European Community had received such status under the EC
Treaty. EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 281.
12.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-434.

13.
Id. at art. 111-426.
14.
Id. at art. 1-8.
15.
Id. at art. 1-19.
16.
Id. at arts. 1-33 to -36. To support its activities, the Union may collect any
information necessary to its tasks. Id. at art. 111-428. It may also compile statistics
appropriate to its work. Id. at art. 111-429. The Union may set the employment laws for
its own employees. Id. at art. 111-427. Union officials and employees are required not to
disclose information "of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy." Id.
at art. 111-430.
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independent
the institutions are subject to review by a completely
17
Ombudsman appointed by the European Parliament.
Like a nation-state, the EU is intended to be a permanent entity
with its Constitution intended to be in place "for an unlimited
period." 18 However, the Union's further expansion is also
contemplated. The EU is to be open "to all European States"
committed to promotion of the Union's values. 19
The corresponding integrity of the Member States. The
Constitution unequivocally requires the EU to "respect the equality of
Member States . . ., their national identities . . ., [and] their essential
state functions." 20 The Union and the Member States are treated as
equals, and each of them is required to adhere to "the principle of
sincere cooperation."21 Under this rule, both the Union and the states
must "in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks
which flow from the Constitution."22 Ultimate homage to the integrity
of the Member States is found in Article 1-60 of the Constitution,
23
which permits a state to unilaterallywithdraw from the EU.
By granting the Union certain rights under Member State law,
such as property ownership, the Constitution underscores the vitality
of Member State law as well as the legal personality of the EU.
Furthermore,the Union is specifically made subject to the contract law
of individual Member States and to tort law based on "the general
24
principles common to the laws of the Member States."
Initial ratification of the Constitution is essentially the same
process as ratification of the earlier treaties-each of the Member
States must approve the instrument at the national level according to
its own constitutional requirements, and the Constitution will become
effective only when all states have ratified.25 Amendments to the
Constitution likewise require unanimous consent of the Member
States, effectively giving each state a veto on even minor changes to the
highly detailed document.26 Furthermore, the accession of new
Member States requires unanimous approval by the existing states
acting through their national procedures.27 And although the EU does
have considerable power to run its own affairs, certain politically
sensitive issues, such as the location of Union institutions and the

17.
Id. at art. 1-49.
18.
Id. at art. IV-446.
19.
Id. at art. 1-58(1).
20.
Id. at art. 1-5(1).
21.
Id. at art. 1-5(2).
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at art. 1-60; see infra text accompanying notes 411-17 (analyzing
withdrawal).
24.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-431.
25.
Id. at art. IV.447.
26.
See infra text accompanying notes 418-21.
27.
CONSTITUTION, supranote 1,at art. 1-58(2).
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official use of languages within the institutions, are subject to
28
unanimous adoption.
Like directives under the previous treaties, the Constitution
provides that "Europeanframework laws" will be binding "as to the
result to be achieved" but leaving to the Member States "the choice of
form and methods." 29 Similarly, certain "Europeanregulations"may
provide that the states will choose how to implement the desired
policy.30 Moreover, in limited circumstances the Member States may
31
be empowered to initiate the EU legislative process.
Budgetary independence. Unlike a typical IGO, the EU is not
dependent on yearly contributions from its members. Rather, the
Constitution calls on the EU to provide itself, through taxation, with
the funds needed to carry out its programs "financed wholly from its
33
own resources." 32 The EU is required to adopt an annual budget,
which must be balanced, 34 and a five-year "multiannual financial
framework" that sets annual ceilings for the various categories of
expenditures. 35 The EU must live within its budget, 36 and the
Member States are expected to cooperate with the Union to ensure
37
proper use of budgeted monies.
Elements of Member State control. The Constitution does not give
the EU institutions a completely free hand in creating the budget and
imposing taxes. European laws "relating to the system of own
resources of the Union" and those that create new categories of
resources (as well as abolishing any existing category) are subject to
both a unanimous vote of the Council and approval by the Member
States.38 Furthermore,each multiannualfinancialframework must be
unanimously approved by the Council.39 This consensus-based
framework will establish the approved categories of expenditures and

28.
Id. at arts. 111-432 to -433.
29.
Id. at arts. 1-33(1), 1-37(1).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at art. 1-34(3).
32.
Id. at art. 1-54.
33.
Id. at arts. 1-56, 111-404; see also id. at arts. 111-403 to -415.
34.
Id. at art. 1-53(2).
35.
Id. at arts. 1-55, 111-402.
36.
Id. at art. 1-53(5).
37.
Id. at arts. 1-53(6), 111-407. The Member States are also required to take
steps to "counter fraud affecting the Union's financial interests." Id. at art. 111-415.
38.
Id. at art. 1-54(3). One commentator has criticized the unanimity
requirement: "Unanimity is now required for all relevant decisions related to own
resources. Majority voting only applies to implementing measures where specifically
provided for in earlier unanimous decisions. In a Union of 25, with crucial decisions on
financing on the horizon, this is far from satisfactory." Giovanni Grevi, Light and shade
of a quasi-Constitution,EPC Issue Paper No. 14, at 8-9 (June 23, 2004), available at
http://www.theepc.net.
39.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-55(2). Furthermore, until the end of
2006 the Constitution requires unanimous Council voting to adopt certain financial
rules relating to the EU budget. Id. at art. 111-412(3).
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the annual appropriationsceilings for each category for periods of at
40
least five years.
The requirement of Member State cooperation on the budget is to
some extent attributableto the fact that substantialportions of the EU
budget arepassed along to the Member States in the form of financial
support for agricultureand other programs,41 and these payments are
of great importanceto the states.
External action. Looking outward, the Union is expected to have
"relations with the wider world," and to contribute to peace, security,
sustainable development, mutual respect among peoples, free and fair
trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human rights, observance
of international law, and respect for the principles of the United
Nations Charter.4 2 The external action of the EU is examined in
greater detail below, as one of the substantive areas of the Union's
43
activity.
Substantiallimitations.As the discussion later in this Article will
elaborate, the authority of the EU to act in external matters is
carefully limited.
EU citizenship. Underscoring the EU's resemblance to a state,
and in stark contrast to a traditional IGO, is the fact that each
national of a Member State is designated a "citizen of the Union." 44
Citizens are granted numerous rights, including the right to "move
and reside freely" in any Member State, the right as a resident to vote
and stand as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament
elections, certain rights to diplomatic and consular assistance from
any Member State, and the right to deal with EU institutions in any
official EU language. 45 The Union is mandated to serve the interests
of its citizens 46 and to offer them "an area of freedom, security and
justice without internal frontiers," along with an effective single
47
market.
To emphasize the benefits of EU citizenship, Part I of the
Constitution contains a boldly expressed section titled "The
Democratic Life of the Union." 48 It begins with a mandate for the EU

40.
Id. at arts. 1-55(1), III-402(1).
41.
Reuters, Chronology-EU Common Agricultural Policy (June 26, 2003),
available at http://www.forbes.com~business/newswire/2003/O6/26/rtrO1l1815.html. For
the authority to support agriculture, see CONSTITUTION, supranote 1, at art. 111-228(2).
42.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-3(4).
43.
See infra text accompanying notes 320-41.
44.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-10(1).
45.
Id. at art. 1-10(2). Additional legislation relating these rights is
contemplated in Part III of the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-125 to -129. Rights relating
to voting and standing for election are reiterated in Part II of the Constitution. Id. at
arts. 11-99 to -100.
46.
Id. at art. 1-19(1).
47.
Id. at art. 1-3(2).
48.
Id. at arts. 1-45 to -52.
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to treat all of its citizens equally, 49 but much more interesting from
an analytical point of view are provisions that underscore the Union's
commitment to the principles of "representative democracy" and
"participatory democracy." 50 These articles guarantee citizens the
right of direct representation at the Union level in the European
Parliament, the right to "participate in the democratic life of the
Union," the right to have EU decisions taken "as openly as possible
and as closely as possible to the citizen," and the right to act through
EU-level political parties. 51 Citizens are also promised a public forum
for their views, access for their representative associations, broad
52
consultation from Union officials, and a right of initiative.
Supplementing these concepts are provisions relating to EU dialogue
with "social partners,"53 the work of a Union Ombudsman, 54 a
requirement of open meetings by most Union institutions, access to
EU documents, 55 a right of personal data protection,5 6 and respect for
57
the national status of churches and non-confessional organizations.
Qualifications. Unlike a federal nation, the EU offers no more
than a supplemental or dual citizenship. The Constitution states:
"Citizenshipof the Union shall be additionalto national citizenship; it
58
shall not replace it."
Rights to vote and stand as a candidate are limited to municipal
and EuropeanParliamentelections. National and provincial elections
are not mentioned, and "municipal" is not defined. Therefore, the
Constitution calls for EU legislation to supplement these provisions,
but such legislation requires unanimous Council approval and may
provide for "derogationswhere warranted by problems specific to a
Member State." 59 The Constitution also contemplates EU legislation
expanding the general rights of citizens as described above, but such
laws will require a unanimous vote on the Council and separate
ratification by each of the Member States.60 The potential for
derogations and the requirement of unanimity represent clear limits
on the authority of the EU to define the rights of its citizens.

49.
Id. at art. 1-45. Principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination are
further discussed in Part II(B)(3) of this Article.
50.
Id. at arts. 1-46 to -47.
51.
Id. at art. 1-46.
52.
Id. at art. 1-47.
53.
Id. at art. 1-48.
54.
Id. at art. 1-49.
55.
Id. at art. 1-50.
56.
Id. at art. 1-51(1). Data protection is also required of Member States when
carrying out EU-mandated activities. Id. at art. 1-51(2).
57.
Id. at art. 1-52. In fact, the EU is required to maintain regular, open, and
transparent dialogue with churches and similar organizations. Id. at art. 1-52(3).
58.
Id. at art. 1-10(1).
59.
Id. at art. 111-126.
60.
Id. at art. 111-129.
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Regarding the "democraticlife of the Union," it is significant that
the same provision that references citizens' direct representationat the
Union level underscores that the Member States themselves are
represented on the European Council and Council, whose respective
members are "democratically accountable either to their national
parliaments, or to their citizens." 61 Also, the EU'S mandate to respect
tied to
churches and non-confessional organizations is specifically
62
their status under the national laws of the Member States.
In an area related to citizens' rights, tort claims may be brought
by injured persons against the EU "in accordance with the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States." 63 Also, the right
to consular assistance from another Member State is based on that
64
state's legal practices in dealing with its own nationals.
2. Mandate and Independence of the EU Institutions
An overview of the EU's institutions is presented in Part I of the
Constitution. 65 This approach was lacking in the EC Treaty and TEU.
Greater detail regarding the functioning of the institutions is
relegated to Part III of the Constitution, 66 which closely resembles
67
the institutional section of the EC Treaty.
General mandate of the institutions. The bodies identified
collectively in the Constitution as the "institutional framework" of the
EU are the European Parliament, European Council, Council,
Commission, and Court of Justice.68 Their mandate is to promote the
Union's values, advance its objectives and serve the interests of the
Union, its citizens, and the Member States. 69 In all instances, the
institutions are to act within the limits of the Constitution. 70 As
described in a later section of this Article, a significant activity of the
7 1
institutions is the creation of EU legislation.
Respect and residual power. By requiring the EU institutions to
serve the interests of the Member States, the Constitution underscores
the continuing vitality of the Member States within the Union. But the
Constitution requires far more. As noted above, the document requires
the EU to respect the national identities of the Member States and

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
1-19 to -32.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at art. 1-46(2).
Id. at art. 1-52(1).
Id. at art. 11-101(3).
Id. at art. 11-106.
Title IV of Part I is titled "The Union's Institutions and Bodies." Id. at arts.
Id. at arts. 111-330 to -401.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, at arts. 189-267.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-19(1).
Id.
Id. at art. 1-19(3).
See infra Part II(C)(2) ("How the EU exercises its competence").
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their functioning as states.72 The Union and the states appear to be
afforded equal status by the Constitution, which uses terms such as
73
"sincerecooperation"and "full mutual respect."
The residual power of the Member States vis-&-vis the EU
institutions is affirmed by limiting EU activity to what is conferred on
the Union "by the Member States in the Constitution to attain the
objectives set out in the Constitution."74 This limit is reinforced by the
75
requirement of Member State unanimity to amend the Constitution.
In addition, the nationalparliamentsof the states must be advised of
all proposed EU legislation,76 and they may object to legislative acts
that might violate the principle of subsidiarity.77 If objections do not
obtain the desired results, groups of Member States may force
reconsideration,78 and any state may challenge the legislation by
79
bringingan action in the European Court of Justice.
European Parliament. The Parliament resembles a traditional
national parliament in that it is elected by popular vote of the EU
citizens, meets annually, elects its own officers, and participates in
enacting legislation and approving the EU budget.80 Its members are
affiliated with European-level political parties.8 1 The Parliament may
set up committees of inquiry to investigate improper implementation
of EU law, 82 and it has the responsibility to appoint the permanent
European Ombudsman to receive citizen complaints about EU
institutions.8 3 The European Parliament determines its own rules of
procedure, 8 4 although the Constitution mandates that decisions of the
85
Parliament generally require a majority of the votes cast.

72.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-5(1). See notes 20-31 supra and
accompanying text..
73.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-5(2).
74.
Id. at art. 1-11(2).
75.
Id. at arts. IV-443 to -445. See infra text accompanying notes 418-21.
76.
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2003
O.J. (C 169) 94, art. 3 [hereinafter Protocol on National Parliaments].
77.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-18(2), 1-11(3), 111-259. See also
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 2003
O.J. (C 169) 95 [hereinafter Protocol on Subsidiarity] (establishing a system for the
monitoring of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). Peter Norman reports
that the Protocol on National Parliaments and the Protocol on Subsidiarity were
"beefed up somewhat" at the Convention "to increase the Member States' safeguards
against any centralising urges emanating from Brussels." NORMAN, supra note 7, at
252.
78.
Protocol on Subsidiarity, supra note 77, at art. 6.
79.
Id. at art. 7; CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-365(2).
80.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-20, 111-336. Greater detail on the
Parliament is found in Part III of the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-330 to -340.
81.
Id. at art. 111-331.
82.
Id. at art. 111-333.
83.
Id. at art. 111-335.
84.
Id. at art. 111-339.
85.
Id. at art. 111-338.
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Upon a proposal by the European Council, Parliament elects the
President of the Commission.8 6 It further enjoys the power to approve
the slate of Commissioners nominated by the President-elect,8 7 and it
can force the resignation of the entire Commission.8 8 Notably,
however, the European Parliament lacks the traditional power of a
national legislature to appoint and remove the highest governmental
officials - in the Union, both the European Council and Council are
beyond Parliament's supervision.8 9 Even more noteworthy is the fact
that Parliament is denied the most basic competence of a legislature,
namely, the right to initiate legislation.9" This power is generally
reserved to the Commission. 9 1
Member State authority. The system for electing the Parliamentis
subject to both a unanimous vote of the Council and separate
ratification by the Member State governments.9 2 And while the
Constitutionsets a maximum size of the European Parliament and a
minimum of six representatives per Member State, the actual
composition of the European Parliament will be subject to a
unanimous vote of the European Council.93 In addition, the Council
must vote unanimously on any rules relating to taxation of
94
Parliament'smembers.
The Parliament's inability to control the European Council and
Council reflects a significant power residing in the Member States,
Representatives on the two Councils are ministerial-level officials of
the national governments, and as such they are answerable to their
national parliaments.95 On the other hand, the limits of Parliament's
legislative power do not correlate to any broad reservationof authority
to the Member States, because the power to initiate EU legislation is
96
generally in the hands of the Commission.
European Council. The European Council has emerged from the
haze of the EC Treaty and the TEU as a body the Constitution

86.
Id. at arts. 1-20(1), 1-27(1).
87.
Id. at art. 1-27(2).
88.
Id. at arts. 1-26(8), 111-340.
89.
See infra text accompanying note 95.
90.
The Parliament may, however, "request" the Commission to submit
particular legislative proposals, and the Commission must inform the Parliament of its
reasons if it does not comply with the request. CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. III332.
91.
Id. at art. 1-26(2). In certain instances legislation may be initiated by a
group of Member States, the European Parliament, or other EU bodies. Id. at art. I34(3).

92.
Id. at art. 111-330(1).
93.
Id. at art. 1-20(2).
94.
Id. at art. 111-330(2).
95.
Id. at arts. 1-21(2), 1-23(2), 1-46(2). See infra text accompanying notes 97111 (describing the European Council), 112-28 (describing the Council).
96.
See supra note 91 regarding exceptions to the Commission's exclusive right
to initiate legislation.
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includes among the Union's institutions. 97 The Constitution calls on
the European Council to meet quarterly9 8 in order to set the "general
political directions and priorities" of the Union. 99 However, actual
legislating is reserved to the Council and the European
Parliament,'" because the European Council "shall not exercise
legislative functions."'' 1
The European Council consists of the heads of state or
government of each of the Member States, a President, and the
President of the Commission, 0 2 although the latter two are not
entitled to vote. 10 3 By virtue of the stature of its voting members, the
European Council represents the supreme executive authority within
the European Union, and even if it technically refrains from
legislating, its members certainly possess the political power to
instruct or influence their counterparts on the Council on legislative
matters.
The President of the European Council 10 4 is a new position
created by the Constitution to replace the half-yearly rotating
presidency under the treaties.10 5 The President will serve a two-andone-half-year term, renewable once, 10 6 and may not hold a national
mandate during his or her term.10 7 In addition to chairing the
European Council, the President will provide cohesive external
representation for the European Union,' 0 8 along with another newly
created official, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. 0 9
Representing the Member States. Because the representatives on
the European Council are the heads of state or government of the
Member States, each member of this body will be expected to promote
and protect the interests of his or her nation. This is in stark contrast
to other EU institutions-such as the Commission, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ),and European Central Bank-whose members
are required to act independently and without regard to any national
consideration.110 Furthermore, the default voting rule for decisions of

97.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-19(1), 111-341. The European Council
is not listed as an institution in the EC Treaty or TEU, but it is mentioned in the
treaties. See, e.g., EC TREATY, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 11; TEU, supra note 2, at arts. 4,
5.
98.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-21(3).

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at art. 1-21(1).
Id. at art. 1-23(1).
Id. at art. 1-21(1).
Id. at art. 1-21(2).
Id. at art. 1-25(4).
Id. at art. 1-22.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 203.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-22(1).
Id. at art. 1-22(3).
Id. at art. 1-22(2).
Id. at art. 1-28.
Id. at arts. 1-26(7), 1-29(2), 1-30(3).
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the European Council is consensus, thus ensuring that each Member
11 1
State has a veto in the broadpolicy decisions of the Union.
Council of Ministers. The Council serves as the upper legislative
chamber of the EU. It must enact legislation jointly with the
European Parliament. 112 It also serves as the Union's senior
executive body, to exercise the budgetary function and "carry out
policy-making and coordinating functions." 113 Although it may not of
do so, and
itself initiate legislation, it may request the Commission to
114
the Commission must either comply or justify its inaction.
The Council meets in various "configurations" depending on the
subject under consideration,1 15 but each configuration is composed of
116
The
one ministerial level representative from each Member State.
presidencies of all configurations other than Foreign Affairs are to be
shared by groups of three states, serving collectively for eighteen
months, with each state holding all of the presidencies for six months
during the eighteen-month term. 117 The groups are to be assigned on
the basis of "equal rotation among the Member States, taking into
account their diversity and geographical balance within the
Union." 118 The Council is assisted by a full-time administrative staff,
including a Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)
and a General Secretariat. 119
The ordinary decisional requirement for the Council is that it
will act on the basis of a qualified majority vote (QMV). 120 Beginning

Id. at art. 1-21(4). The Constitution provides in specific instances for
111.
European Council decisions to be taken by less than unanimity. For situations calling
for a qualified majority vote, see id. at arts. 1-22(1) (election of the European Council
President), 1-27(1) (selection of the Commission President), 1-28(1) (appointment or
removal of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs), 111-382(2) (appointment of the
Executive Board of the European Central Bank). Abstentions by a member of the
European Council will not prevent unanimous decisions from being taken. Id. at art.
III-341(1). The European Council may adopt its own procedural rules by simple
majority vote. Id. at art. 111-341(3). It may also decide by simple majority whether to
examine proposed amendments to the Constitution and whether to convene a new
constitutional convention. Id. at art. IV-443(2).
Id. at art. 1-23(1). Further details on the Council are presented in Part III
112.
of the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-342 to -346.
Id. at art. 1-23(1).
113.
Id. at art. 111-345.
114.
Id. at art. 1-24(1).
115.
Id. at art. 1-23(2). The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is an additional
116.
member, and chair, of the Foreign Affairs configuration. Id. at art. 1-28(3).
Draft Decision of the European Council on the Exercise of the Presidency of
117.
the Council of Ministers, art. 1, CIG 81/04, at 13 (June 16, 2004) [hereinafter Draft
Decision]. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-24(7) (mandating the European
Council's decision).
118.
Draft Decision, supra note 117, art. 1.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-344.
119.
120.
Id. at art. 1-23(3). The "ordinary legislative procedure" for adopting
European laws or framework laws is set forth in Article 111-396 of the Constitution. Id.
at art. 111-396.
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in 2009, the usual formula for a QMV will be approval by "at least
55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of
them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the
population of the Union." 12 1 Thus, because more than half of the
states must be represented in a prevailing vote, no small group of the
largest Member States will be able to dictate decisions. On the other
hand, because of the sixty-five percent population rule, a small group
of the largest states will be able to prevent a successful vote, although
the Constitution requires at least four states to form a "blocking
minority." 122 Under qualified majority voting, no single Member
State will have the ability to block EU legislation.
An additionalvoice for the Member States. There is little question
that members of the Council, like their counterparts on the European
Council, are expected to represent the separate interests of the Member
States. There is no requirement for the ministers to act independently,
and in fact the Constitutionspeaks of them as having the authority to
"commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its
vote." 123 The influence of each state is further protected by the
guarantee that the presidencies of most Council configurations must
124
be assigned on the basis of "equalrotation"among the states.
Despite the fact that the standard requirement is that Council
decisions be made by qualified majority vote, the Constitution contains
numerous provisions requiring the Council to act unanimously.125 The

121.
Id. at art. 1-25(1); Protocol on the Transitional Provisions Relating to the
Institutions and Bodies of the Union, art. 2(1), CIG 86/04, at 326 (June 28, 2004). The
Constitution's QMV formula represents a departure from the weighted voting formulas
inserted into the EC Treaty through the Treaty of Nice. EC TREATY, supra note 2, at
art. 205. The formula proposed by the Convention was a majority of Member States
representing three-fifths of the EU population, but this had been blocked by Spain and
Poland at the December 2003 meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference. Thomas
Fuller, Split on Weighted Voting Sinks the EU CharterTalks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
15, 2003, at 1. In addition to the standard sixty-five/fifty-five formula, in certain
instances the voting requirement is seventy-two percent of Council members
representing at least sixty-five percent of the Union population. CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, at art. 1-25(2).
122.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-25(1). Giovanni Grevi observes that
the requirement of four states to form a blocking minority will "prevent Germany, the
UK, France or Italy from forming a blocking coalition of three." Grevi, supra note 38, at
6. However, a draft Council decision will require the Council to reconsider any measure
if requested by Member States with three-fourths of the population or three-fourths of
the number of states necessary to form a blocking minority. Draft Council Decision
relating to the Implementation of Article 1-25 [previously Article 1-24], art. 1, CIG
85/04, at 8 (June 18, 2004).
123.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-23(2).
124.
Id. at art. 1-24(7).
125.
See id. at arts. 1-27(2) (common accord), 111-124(1), 111-125(2), 111-126, III129, 111-157(3), 111-158(4), 111-168(2), 111-171(1), 111-173, 111-176, 111-184(13), 111-185(6),
111-210(3), 111-212(2), 111-223(2), 111-234(2), 111-237, 111-256(3), 111-269(3), 111-270(2), III271(1), III-274(1), 111-274(4), 111-275(3), 111-277, 111-291, III-300(1), 111-312(6) (certain
Member States only), 111-315(4), 111-325(8), III-326(1), III-330(1)-(2), 111-348(2), 111-354,
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Constitution does extend QMV to new areas,126 but it retains the
consensus requirement in many key policy areas, as noted at various
points in this Article.127 In addition, amending the Council's voting
procedures in any area requires a unanimous decision by the
European Council and the right of any national parliament to block
128
the change.
European Commission. The Commission acts as the permanent
executive and chief administrative body of the European Union, and
it has the primary role in proposing new EU legislation. 129 The
Commission serves as the promoter of "the general interest of the
Union," guardian of the Constitution, and manager of the EU budget
and programs. 130 It also has the task of enforcing EU law, 131 and its
132
enforcement responsibilities extend even to the Member States.
The Commission is required to be independent at all times, and its
members may not "seek nor take instructions from any government
or other institution, body, office or agency." 133 It is, however,
answerable to the European Parliament, which may censure the
1 34
Commission and force its members' resignation.
In a controversial departure from the system under the treaties,
which allowed each Member State full voting representation on the
Commission at all times, 135 the Constitution provides for eventual
reduction in the size of the body. Commencing in 2014 the

111-359(4), 111-386, 111-389, 111-393, III-395(1), 111-396(9), 111-412(3), 111-419(2), III420(2), 111-421, III-422(1)-(2), 111-433, 111-436(2). Note that this list is not exhaustive,
because certain other provisions may contain cross-references to the unanimous voting
requirements of these articles. See, e.g., id. at art. 111-405(2).
126.
Two commentators have described the additional areas for QMV as
"technical policy areas with cross-border implications...." Brendan Donnelly & Lars
Hoffmann, All change or no change? Convention, constitutionand national sovereignty,
FEDERAL TRUST POLICY BRIEF, at 3 (Nov. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/
uploads[PolicyBriefl.pdf.
127.
In a thought-provoking analysis, Andreas Fellesdal argues that the move
toward more QMV decision-making in the EU "requires a well-developed trust in other
Europeans and officials," and that it is "unsurprising that the default procedure [QMV]
does not apply in a number of key cases involving legislation on matters close to
national sovereignty." Andreas Fellesdal, Achieving Stability? Forms and Arenas of
Institutionaland National Balances in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, FEDERAL TRUST
ONLINE PAPER No. 06/04, at 5 (Mar. 2004), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/
constitution/06_04.pdf.
128.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. IV-444(3).
129.
Id. at art. 1-26(2). Additional details regarding the Commission are found in
Part III of the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-347 to -352.
130.
Id. at art. 1-26(1).
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at art. 111-360.
133.
Id. at art. 1-26(7). Member States are required to respect the
Commissioners' independence and "not seek to influence them in the performance of
their tasks." Id. at art. 111-347.
134.
Id. at art. 1-26(8).
135.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 213.
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Commission's membership will consist of representatives from twothirds of the Member States, including its President and the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs136-each of whom will serve a five-year
term. 3 7 Representation on the Commission is to be assigned with
demographic and geographical diversity in mind but also on the basis
of a strictly enforced "equal rotation between the Member States." 138
In keeping with the Commission's status as a central organ of
the EU, members of the Commission, its President, and the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs are appointed by other EU
institutions. 1 39 The President is nominated by a qualified majority
vote of the European Council and elected by the European
Parliament. 140 The European Council, with the consent of the
President-elect, also "appoint[s]" the Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs by qualified majority vote. 14 1 Each of the Member States to be
represented on the Commission then "suggest[s]" its candidate to the
Council and President-elect; the Council and President-elect then, by
common accord, adopt the list of candidates. The entire slate of
President, Foreign Affairs Minister, and Commissioners is then
submitted for approval by the Parliament and is thereafter appointed
1
by a QMV vote of the European Council. 42
Once the Commission is approved, its President is empowered to
determine its internal organization, while the Commission adopts its
own rules of procedure. 143 Commission decisions are taken by
144
majority vote.
Limited Member State influence. In general, the Constitution
creates considerable institutional separation between the Member
States and the Commission. The only Commission-related matters
subject to direct state influence are the consensus voting requirement
for the European Council to determine the Commission's rotation145
and the exclusive right of each Member State to name its candidatefor
146
a seat on the Commission.

136.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-26(6).

137.
Id. at art. 1-26(3). A Commissioner must resign if so requested by the
Commission President, or upon the order of the ECJ. Id. at arts. 1-27(3), 111-349. A
replacement will be selected in the same fashion as the original appointment. Id. at
art. 111-348(2).
138.
Id. at art. 1-26(6).
139.
Id. at arts. 1-27, 1-28(1).
140.
Id. at art. 1-27(1).
141.
Id. at art. 1-28(1).
142.
Id. at art. 1-27(2).
143.
Id. at arts. 1-27(3), 111-350, 111-352.
144.
Id. at art. 111-351.
145.
Id. at art. 1-26(6).
146.
Id. at art. 1-27(2).
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Other bodies. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), 147 European
Central Bank (ECB), 148 and Court of Auditors 149 are bodies that are
central to the EU and independent of the other Union institutions
and the Member States. The Constitution also provides for a
European Investment Bank to carry out the financing of certain EU
projects. 150 In addition, there are two EU advisory committees, the
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee, 15 1
whose members are not to be subject to any mandatory instructions,
are to be "completely independent," and are to pursue "the Union's
'152
general interest.
Both the ECJ and the ECB are granted certain power over the
Member States. The Court may try cases brought by the Commission
against a state or by one Member State against another, the ground
for action being that the accused state "has failed to fulfil an
obligation under the Constitution. 15 3 The ECJ may also issue
judgments requiring the defendant state to comply with a Court
decision, or, failing that, to pay a "lump sum or penalty payment." 154
The ECB is given sweeping power over the monetary policies of the
55
Member States within the euro-zone.'
Member State involvement. The ECJ is composed of one judge
from each of the Member States, and the appointment ofjudges is to be
accomplished by "common accord" of the states.156 Supplementing the
Court-relatedprovisions of the Constitution, the Statute of the Court of
Justice is set forth in a Protocol, which is attached to and part of the
Constitution.1 57 Certain provisions of the Statute may be amended
only through the elaborate procedure required to amend the
Constitution itself, which requires ratification by each Member
158
State.
The ECJ'sjurisdiction in suits against the Union is exclusive only
to the extent that jurisdiction is specifically conferred by the

147.
Id. at art. 1-29. A great deal of detail about the ECJ, its related bodies, and
its jurisdiction is found in Part III of the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-353 to -381.
148.
Id. at art. 1-30(3). For more detail regarding the ECB, see id. at arts. III185 to -202.
149.
Id. at art. 1-31. Additional provisions are found in Part III of the
Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-384 to -385.
150.
Id. at arts. 111-393 to -394.
151.
Id. at arts. 1-32, 111-386 to -392.
152.
Id. at art. 1-32(4).
Id. at arts. 111-360 to -361.
153.
Id. at art. 111-362.
154.
155.
Id. at art. 1-30. Monetary policy is dealt with in greater detail in Part III of
the Constitution. Id. at arts. 111-185 to -202.
156.
Id. at arts. 1-29(2), 111-355. Advocates-General and members of the General
Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) are also chosen by common accord of the
Member States. Id. at arts. 111-355 to -356.
157.
Id. at arts. 111-381, IV-442.
158.
Id. at arts. 111-381, IV-443.
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Constitution. In other cases, the courts of the Member States will have
concurrent jurisdiction.1 59 In general, the ECJ will have no
jurisdiction in matters related to the common foreign and security
policy or the common security and defense policy.160 The Court's
jurisdiction is also restricted in matters relating to the area of
freedom, security, andjustice, if such matters have been reserved to the
61
Member States.1
The ECB does not eliminate the central banks of the euro-zone
Member States. Rather, each state in the euro-zone will place its national
central bank's governor on the ECB's Governing Council,162 and the
16 3
national banks participatein carryingout the central monetary policy.
However, the national central banks must, in their EU activity, be
completely independent of their nationalgovernments.164 Those Member
States that are outside the euro-zone continue to enjoy substantial
autonomy over their own monetarypolicies,16 5 although they are required
166
to cooperate with the Union on matters such as exchange-ratepolicy.
The Court of Auditors is composed of one national from each
16 7
Member State, with each member being proposed by his or her state.
Once appointed to the Court, the members must act with complete
independence.168 The members of the European Investment Bank
(EIB) are the Member States themselves, and the EIB's Statute, which
is a Protocol to the Constitution, can be amended only by a unanimous
vote of the Council.169 The members of the EU's two advisory
committees are proposed by the Member States, and allocation of
0
committee seats is by a unanimous vote of the Council.17
B. Values and Objectives
Both the EC Treaty and the TEU contain broad statements of
values and objectives, 17 1 and the drafters of the Constitution have
seized the opportunity to include such expressions in the new

159.
Id. at art. 111-375.
160.
Id. at art. 111-376. See infra text accompanying notes 342-76 (discussing the
CFSP and CSDP).
161.
Id. at art. 111-377. See infra text accompanying notes 377-96 (discussing the
AFSJ and the rights of the Member States).
162.
Id. at art. 111-382(1).
163.
Id. at art. 1-30(1). National central banks, for example, may be authorized
by the ECB to issue euro notes. Id. at art. 111-186.
164.
Id. at art. 111-188.
165.
Id. at arts. 111-197 to -202.
166.
Id. at art. 111-200.
167.
Id. at arts. 1-31(3), 111-385(2).
168.
Id. at arts. 1-31(3), 111-385(3).
169.
Id. at art. 111-393.
170.
Id. at arts. 111-386, 111-389 to -390.
171.
See TEU, supra note 2, at pmbl., arts. 1-3, 6; EC TREATY, supra note 2, at
pmbl., arts. 2-6.
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document. 172 However, in and among the goals for the Union, the
authors of the Constitution have chosen to include affirmations of the
Member States and their separate traditions.
1. Union Values
The Constitution's Preamble emphasizes the "cultural, religious
and humanist inheritance of Europe" and the "universal values of the
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy,
equality, freedom and the rule of law." 173 The Preamble to Part II of
the Constitution, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union,
174
reiterates these ideas.
References to the EU's values may also be found within the body
of the Constitution. The Union is to be open "to all European States
which respect its values and are committed to promoting them
together." 175 Article 1-2 is titled "The Union's Values," and it
identifies them as "respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities." 176 Thereafter the Union
and its institutions are called upon to promote its values; 177 for
example, these values are to be the foundation for the EU's
relationships with its neighboring states. 178 Member States may be
requested to take action to "protect the Union's values and serve its
interests." 179 To demonstrate the seriousness of the Union's
commitment to its stated values, the Constitution permits the EU to
suspend the Constitutional rights of a Member State if it commits a
"serious and persistent breach" of the values articulated in Article I2.180

National traditions.Prefacinga statement about closer union and
common destiny, the Constitution'sPreamble speaks of the "peoples" of
Europe (not 'people') who remain 7"proud of their own national
identities and history." 18 1 The paradoxical phrase "united in its

172.
See CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at pmbl., arts. 1-2 to -3.
173.
Id. at pmbl.
174.
Id. at pt. II(pmbl.).
175.
Id. at art. 1-1(2).
176.
Id. at art. 1-2. The values expressed in Article 1-2 are amplified in Part III
of the Constitution, relating to the EU's external action. Id. at art. III-292(1).
177.
Id. at arts. I-3(1), 1-3(4), 1-19(1).
178.
Id. at art. 1-57(1).
179.
Id. at art. 1-41(5).
180.
Id. at art. 1-59; see infra text accompanying notes 405-10 (discussing
suspension of rights).
181.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at pmbl. Commenting on "people" versus
"peoples," Kalypso Nicolaidis argues that homogeneous European community is not
necessary. "Our European demoi-cracy is predicated on the mutual recognition,
confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our respective and separate
identities - not on their merger." Nicolaidis, supranote 4,at 5.

1014

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37-993

diversity" is also used, and credit is given to the European Convention
for having written the Constitution on behalf of the "States of Europe"
as well as for the citizens of Europe.'8 2 The Preamble to Part II
declares that the Union respects "the diversity of the cultures and
traditionsof the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of
the Member States." 183
Article 1-2 of the Constitution refers to values that are "common to
the Member States." 184 The Preamble to Part H also proclaims regard
for "the constitutional traditions and international obligations
common to the Member States." 18 5 Elsewhere, the Constitution
affirms the EU's respect for the status of churches and other religious
and secular associations under the national laws of the Member
86
States.1
2. Union Objectives
The Constitution's Preamble speaks of a "reunited" Europe that
"intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and
prosperity." 187 This Europe also "wishes to remain a continent open
to culture, learning and social progress . . .to deepen the democratic
and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace,
justice and solidarity throughout the world." 188 In correspondingly
broad terms the Preamble to Part II emphasizes the objective of
strengthening the "protection of fundamental rights." 189 This goal is
the subject of a separate analysis below.
The substantive text of the Constitution likewise contains
references to the EU's objectives. The principal section is Article I-3,
appropriately titled "The Union's Objectives." It describes the Union's
aims as promoting peace, well-being, freedom, security, justice, a
single market, sustainable development, full employment, social
progress, and protection of the environment. 190 Similar objectives are
stated in the initial provisions of Part III of the Constitution. 191
Article 1-4 adds the goal of guaranteeing the "four freedoms" on which
the internal market is based, 192 and it prohibits within the EU "any
discrimination on grounds of nationality." 193

182.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at pmbl.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

pt. II(pmbl.).
art. 1-2.
pt. II(pmbl.).
art. 1-52(1).
pmbl.

at
at
at
at
at

pt. II(pmbl.).
art. 1-3.
arts. 111-115 to -120.
art. 1-4(1).
art. 1-4(2); see infra note 286 (describing the four freedoms).
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In broad terms, the EU institutions are required to "advance" the
Union's objectives, 194 not only within the Union, but in "the wider
world." 195 At the same time, the Member States are expected to
"facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any
measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the Union's
objectives." 196 Interestingly, where the Constitution permits
"enhanced cooperation" among groups of Member States-an activity
that arguably undercuts the solidarity of the EU-even such
programs are mandated to "further the objectives of the Union." 197
Member State objectives. In establishing the EU, the
Constitution's stated purpose is "to attain objectives" that the Member
States "have in common," and the Union is required to "coordinatethe
policies by which the Member States aim to achieve these
objectives." 198 In the provisions of Article 1-3, the Union is mandated
to promote the well-being of its 'peoples" rather than its "people."199
Its goals further include "economic, social and territorial cohesion,
and solidarity among Member States," as well as respect for the
Union's "rich cultural and linguistic diversity." 20 0 The EU is expected
to take steps to achieve its objectives, but only by "appropriatemeans,
depending on the extent to which the relevant competences are
20
conferred upon it in the Constitution." 1
In one of the more interesting turns of phrase in the Constitution,
the EU is mandated to exercise its conferred competences "in the
Community way." 20 2 These words were inserted to replace an early
draft's more ambitious phrase "on a federal basis."20 3 No doubt
because of the anti-federalist sensitivities of many European leaders,

194.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-19(1).
195.
Id. at art. 1-3(4).
196.
Id. at art. 1-5(2).
197.
Id. at art. 1-44(1); see infra text accompanying notes 400-04 (discussing the
significance of enhanced cooperation).
198.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. I-1(1). Andreas Follesdal warns that
the Constitution pays "insufficient attention to the relationship between the objectives
of the Union institutions and those of Member States, and their relative importance."
Follesdal, supra note 127, at 5.
199.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-3(1).
200.
Id. at art. 1-3(3).
201.
Id. at art. 1-3(5). The Constitution emphasizes that the authority of the EU
to pursue its objectives arises directly and solely from the competences conferred upon
it by the Member States. Id. at arts. I-1(1), 1-11(1). See infra text accompanying notes
224-31 (discussing the principle of conferral).
202.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. I-1(1).
203.
The Preliminary Draft of the Constitution described "[a] Union of European
States which, while retaining their national identities, closely coordinate their policies
at the European level, and administer certain common competences on a federal basis."
Praesidium of the European Convention, Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty,
CONV 369/02, Oct. 28, 2002, pt. 1, art. 1.
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the "infamous F-word"20 4 is never used in the Constitution to describe
20 5
the Union's objectives or institutions.
3. Protection of Rights of Individuals
As already noted, Part II of the Constitution incorporates the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union (the Charter) into
European Union law. 20 6 This development gives substance to the
conviction held by many that the EU must extend its objectives
beyond the economic sphere, and the inclusion of a human rights
charter in the Constitution represents a potentially profound step in
a new direction. The following brief analysis illustrates both the new
responsibilities assigned to the Union and the considerable deference
that the Constitution pays to the role of Member States in the field of
individual rights.
The Charter begins with a Preamble that acknowledges the
Union's heritage and traditions, the diversity of its peoples, and the
identities of the Member States. Against that background, the
Preamble concludes with the following commitment: "The Union
therefore recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out
hereafter." 207 The ensuing text is divided into titles such as "Dignity,
Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights and Justice." In a
final title relating to general application of the Charter, it is noted
that the provisions of the Charter "are addressed to the Institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union . . .and to the Member
States only when they are implementing Union law. ' 20 8 Thus, EU
activity at all levels is subject to the Charter's sweeping principles.
Apart from the Charter, the Constitution requires the Union to
"accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." 209 A 1996 ruling of the ECJ had
concluded that the European Community lacked the competence to do
so.21 The Constitution also incorporates as "general principles of the

204.
Markus G. Puder, Constitutionalizingthe European Union - More Than a
Sense of DirectionFrom the Convention on the Future of Europe, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1562, 1583 (2003).
205.
Kalypso Nicolaidis argues forcefully that the word "federal" might
appropriately be used for the hybrid EU but in the sense of a "federal union, not as a
federal state." He concedes that the phrase "community way" is "an acceptable second
best." Nicolaidis, supra note 4, at 6.
206.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at pt. II, arts. 11-61 to -114.
207.
Id. at pt. II(pmbl.).
208.
Id. at art. 11-111(1).
209.
Id. at art. 1-9(2).
210.
The ECJ ruled: "As Community law now stands, the Community has no
competence to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on the
Community institutions in a general way the power to enact rules concerning human
rights or to conclude international agreements in this field .... Case 2/94, Accession
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Union's law" the fundamental rights resulting "from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States." 211 Last, a
series of articles in Part III of the Constitution, titled "NonDiscrimination and Citizenship," provides for EU legislation relating
to nationality-based discrimination and the rights guaranteed to EU
2 12
citizens.
Member State law and practice. With respect to human rights, the
most significant reference to the Member States in Part I of the
Constitution is the provision that incorporatesas general principles of
EU law the fundamental rights resulting from "the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States." 2 13 In essence, this imposes
on private parties, Union institutions, and even the states themselves
the daunting task of studying the laws of all of the EU nations to
discern these common traditions.
Part II of the Constitution, the Charter, contains numerous
references to national laws of the Member States. For example, the
right to education is to be respected "in accordance with the national
laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right."214 The right
to conduct business is recognized but "in accordance with Union law
and national laws and practices." 2 15 The same joint reference to EU
law and national laws and practices is found in provisions relating to
certain rights of workers2 16 and rights relating to social security and
social assistance.2 17 Moreover, health care rights and rights of "access
to services of general economic interest" are tied to "the conditions
2 18
established by national laws and practices."
In the general provisions at the end of the Charter, emphasis is
given to the limits of Union competence and the principle of
subsidiarity.2 19 In forceful terms it is stated that the Charter "does not
extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify
220
powers and tasks defined in the other Partsof the Constitution."
Last, the provisions on interpretationof the Charter reiterate the
need, in certain circumstances contemplated in the Charter, to
recognize the constitutional traditions common to the Member States

by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759 (advisory opinion).
211.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-9(3).

212.
Id. at arts. 111-123 to -129; see supra text accompanying notes 44-64
(discussing EU citizenship).
213.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-9(3).

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

art. H-74(3).
art. IH-76.
arts. 11-87 to -88, 11-90.
art. 11-94.
arts. 11-95 to -96.
art. 11-111(1).
art. 11-111(2).
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and to take "full account" of the national laws and practices of the
states.221 The Charter also prohibits any interpretation of its
provisions in a manner that would adversely affect human rights
recognized elsewhere by Union law, by international agreements to
which the EU or individual states may be a party, or by Member State
222
constitutions.
C. Relationship Between EU and Member State Competences
In the preceding analyses of the essential nature and the values
of the European Union, the Constitution's textual emphasis on both
the Union and its Member States has been demonstrated. Beyond
these statements and affirmations, the Constitution addresses the
separate competences of the EU and the states in a clearer, more
formal manner than was articulated in the treaties. One of the great
contributions of the Constitution may well be this increased attention
to describing the allocation of power between the EU institutions and
the governments of the Member States.
1. Principles Underlying EU Action
The Constitution reveals a number of foundational principles
that both reinforce and restrict Union power. Most of these precepts
are expressed in a series of articles in Part I, gathered under the
heading "Union Competences." 223
Conferral. The Constitution grants a wide range of power and
authority to the EU, but the first principle is one of limitation.
Power flows from the Member States. The first article in the
Constitution states that "this Constitution establishes the European
Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain
objectives they have in common." 224 Furthermore, "[t]he limits of
Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral."225
Pursuant to this principle, "the Union shall act within the limits of the
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the
226
Constitution to attain the objectives set out in the Constitution."
The EU is to "ensure consistency" in its activities in light of its

Id. at arts. 11-112(4), 11-112(6).
221.
222.
Id. at art. II-113. One commentator has asserted that Article IH-113, by
deferring to these non-EU sources of law, undermines the principle of primacy of EU
law. Michael Dougan, The Convention's Draft Constitutional Treaty: A 'Tidying-Up
Exercise' that Needs Some Tidying-up of Its Own, FEDERAL TRUST ONLINE PAPER NO.
27/03, at 3 (Aug. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/27-03.pdf; see
infra text accompanying notes 232-39 (discussing the principle of primacy).
223.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-11 to -18.
Id. at art. 1-1(1).
224.
Id. at art. 1-11(1).
225.
226.
Id. at art. 1-11(2).
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objectives and "in accordance with the principle of conferring of
powers." 227 For avoidance of doubt, the Constitution adds:
"Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution
228
remain with the Member States."
The conferral concept is augmented by the fact that the
Constitution must be ratified by all of the Member States "in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, 229 and
23 0
that upon ratification it will repeal the EC Treaty and the TEU.
The Constitution will have no legal effect until it is ratified as a treaty,
and the EU will have no existence or power under the Constitution
2 31
until the ratificationprocess has been completed.
Primacy. The effectiveness of EU action within the Union has its
legal basis in the principle of primacy. The Constitution states that
the Constitution itself and the "law adopted by the Union's
Institutions in exercising competences conferred on it, shall have
primacy over the law of the Member States." 232 The Member States
in turn are required to "take any appropriate measure ... to ensure
fulfillment of the obligations flowing from the Constitution or
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union." 233 Closely
connected to the concept of primacy is the principle that "European
laws," which are legislative acts of the Union "of general
application[J" are binding in their entirety throughout the EU and
are "directly applicable in all Member States." 234
Implied limits. Primacy flows from the propriety of the action
taken. Any act of the Union that exceeds its conferred authority would
presumably lack legal effectiveness and thus would not have primacy
over Member State law. Also, European framework laws and certain
regulations, both of which are included in the family of EU "legal
instruments," are subject to further action at the Member State
level.235 These instruments are consideredto be binding only "as to the
result to be achieved" and not as to the "form and methods" of

227.
Id. at art. 111-115.
228.
Id. at art. 1-11(2). Two commentators have observed that Article 1-11(2)
'underlines that Union competences derive from the Member States who remain the
'masters of the treaties'." Lars Hoffmann & Jo Shaw, Constitutionalism and
Federalism in the 'Futureof Europe' Debate: The German Dimension, FEDERAL TRUST
ONLINE PAPER No. 03/04, at 7 (Feb. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/
constitution03_04.pdf.
229.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. IV-447(1).
230.
Id. at art. IV-437(1).
231.
Michael Dougan contends that the ratification requirement "reflects one of
the organising principles of the Union order-of ultimate equality between the Member
States in their capacity as Treaty authors." Dougan, supranote 222, at 13.
232.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-6.
233.
Id. at art. 1-5(2).
234.
Id. at art. 1-33(1).
235.
Id.
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achieving that result.236 If each Member State is permitted to
determine the details for governing the regulated activity within its
own territory, then it might be argued that the control over that
activity-the primacy of authority, so to speak-is shared between the
EU and the state.
Primacy as a concept may have complexities not readily apparent
in the Constitution's appealingly simple formulation. Paul Craig
raises several concerns, including his assertion that the wording of
Article 1-6 leaves room to argue that EU law has primacy over
national legislation but not over national constitutions.237 He also
questions whether EU regulations should have primacy equal to EU
legislation, whether the Member States retain a residual competence
(Kompetenz-Komtetenz) to decide issues of primacy, and whether the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality limit the scope of
primacy.238 He assures the academic world that Article 1-6 will not
239
"signalthe death of one of the staple topics in EU law courses."
Pre-emption. The concept of pre-emption is not mentioned as
such in the Constitution, but it arises from the Constitution's
classification of powers in terms of exclusivity. Certain delineated
competences are granted to the EU alone, 240 while all other
competences conferred on the Union are shared between the EU and
the Member States. 24 1 Where the Constitution assigns the EU an
exclusive competence, only the Union may legislate, unless it assigns
authority to the states or the Union act requires Member State
implementation. 242 In areas where competence is shared, the EU may
act at any time, and Member States may legislate only "to the extent
that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising,

236.
Id.
Paul Craig, What Constitution does Europe Need?, FEDERAL TRUST ONLINE
237.
PAPER No. 26/03, at 8 (Aug. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/
26_03.pdf.
238. Id. at 8-9.
239. Id. at 8. Michael Dougan also questions "the merits of the Convention's
attempt to codify a principle characterised by sophisticated nuance in the [EU]
caselaw, and extensive debate among academics." Dougan, supra note 222, at 7. He
suggests that "we should accept that this is a largely hortatory provision which offers
little of substance to the complex debate on relations between the Union and domestic
legal orders." Id. at 8.
240. CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-13. In addition to the exclusive
competence to legislate under Article 1-13, the Union alone is granted the authority to
take "supporting, coordinating or complementary action" relating to Member State
activity in a number of areas. Id. at art. 1-17. Such EU action does not supersede the
underlying competence of the Member States in these areas and may not "entail
harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations." Id. at art. 1-12(5). Paul Craig
has noted the paradox posed by EU supporting acts that are on the one hand binding
on the Member States but on the other hand may not pre-empt or require
harmonization of national law. Craig, supra note 237, at 7-8.
241.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-14.

242.

Id. at art. 1-12(1).
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its competence." 243 Thus, whether the EU has been granted exclusive
or shared authority in a field, its lawmaking may completely preempt Member State legislation in the same area.
A role for the Member States. As previously noted, in the case of
European framework laws and certain European regulations, it will
be left to the Member States to pass implementing legislation.244 While
such framework laws and regulations emanating from the EU are
binding on the Member States "as to the result to be achieved," 45 by
their nature they require, rather than pre-empt, Member State action
in the subject field.
Subsidiarity and proportionality. The closely related concepts of
subsidiarity and proportionality may be seen as logical extensions of
the conferral principle. With the EU limited to the competences
specifically granted under the Constitution, and with all other
authority reserved to the Member States, it is not surprising that
even where permitted to act the Union will be required to proceed
conservatively.
Limits on Union action. The terms "subsidiarity" and
"proportionality"smack of Euro-jargon, but the Constitution offers
definitions. The principle of subsidiarity requires that "in areas which
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if
and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at
regionaland local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects
246
of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level."
Proportionality,on the other hand, is not limited to areas outside the
Union's exclusive competence. In all matters of EU activity, "the
content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Constitution."24 7 Both principles are
248
obviously intended to protect the residuum of Member State power,
249
and both are carryovers from the EC Treaty.
However, the
Constitution creates a new right of Member State parliaments to be
advised of all proposed EU legislation,250 and they have a right to

243.
Id. at art. 1-12(2).
244.
Id. at arts. 1-33(1), 1-37.
245.
Id. at art. 1-33(1).
246.
Id. at art. 1-11(3).
247.
Id. at art. 1-11(4).
248.
Lars Hoffmann and Jo Shaw assert that "in reality the [subsidiarity]
principle itself is both unclear and widely regarded as rather toothless." Hoffmann &
Shaw, supra note 228, at 6. They add that subsidiarity "has never been successfully
invoked, for example, before the Court of Justice as a basis for a finding that a measure
should not have been adopted by the EU institutions." Id.
249.
EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 5.
250.
Protocol on National Parliaments, supra note 76, at art. 1(2).
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object to laws that they believe will violate the subsidiarity
251
principle.
Flexibility. Even the highly detailed Constitution cannot
anticipate every need for EU action. As a consequence, the drafters
included a flexibility clause, Article 1-18, which allows the Union in
limited circumstances to take steps beyond its designated
competences. 252 Peter Ludlow has called this provision "a potentially
far-reaching enabling clause" that may "obviate the need for future
253
IGC's" to amend the Constitution.
Detailed safeguards. Substantively, any step taken under the
flexibility clause must be "within the framework of the policies defined
254
in Part III, to attain one of the objectives set by the Constitution."
Procedurally, the process begins with the Commission proposing an
255
action and advising the Member State parliamentsof the proposal.
The parliamentsmay issue a challenge if they believe that the proposal
will violate the subsidiarity rule.25 6 The next step is to obtain the

consent of the European Parliament, and last the Council must vote
unanimously to approve the action.2 57 One further restriction is that
actions taken under the flexibility provision may not require
harmonization of Member State law if such harmonization is
prohibited by the Constitution.258 In other words, the flexibility
procedure may fill Constitutionalgaps, but it may not serve as a backdoor method to exceed the Constitution'slimits.

251.

CONSTITUTION,

supra note

1,

at

arts.

1-18(2),

1-11(3);

Protocol

on

Subsidiarity, supra note 77, § 5.
252.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-18.
253.
Peter Ludlow, The Thessaloniki European Council, EUROCOMMENT
BRIEFING NOTE NO. 2.3, at 28 (July 3, 2003).
254.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-18(1). Michael Dougan has
commented: "This means that the flexibility clause could not be used either to add new
objectives to the Constitution, or to exceed the basic parameters of Union competence
established in Part III." Dougan, supra note 222, at 4. However, Dougan does note that
Article 1-18 is slightly broader than its predecessor, Article 308 of the EC Treaty, in
that the new provision is not limited to action tied to the "operation of the common
market." Id.; see EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 308.
255.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-18(2).
256.
See CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-11(3), 111-259; see also Protocol
on Subsidiary, supra note 77, at art. 5 (explaining that any national parliament may,
within six weeks from the date of transmission of the Commission's legislative
proposal, send to the Commission a "reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the
proposal in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiary.").
257.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-18(1). Michael Dougan observes that
in an enlarged EU the unanimity requirement "automatically reduces the practical
significance of the flexibility clause." Dougan, supra note 222, at 4. Nevertheless, Peter
Ludlow contends that the need for consensus "need not inhibit boldness." Ludlow,
supra note 253, at 28-29. He notes that the "radical expansion of the European
Community's agenda in the 1970s" was accomplished through a series of unanimous
decisions under the EC Treaty. Id..
258.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-18(3).
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Stability. The Constitution is intended to be a permanent
document, effective "for an unlimited period." 259 Because critical
aspects of allocation of power-such as assignment of competences or
designation of QMV versus unanimous voting-are found within the
constitutional text, nothing short of an amendment to the document
will legitimately change the express constitutional balance of
authority between the Union and Member States.
Unanimity required to amend the Constitution. As explained in
greater detail below, any amendment to the Constitution requires the
260
unanimous approval of the Member States.
2. How the EU Exercises Its Competence
In a section titled "Exercise of Union Competence," 2 61 the
Constitution describes the functioning of the EU institutions in their
legislative and regulatory activity. Six "legal instruments" are to be
employed, including "European laws, European framework laws,
European regulations, European decisions, recommendations and
opinions." 262 These represent a simplification from the treaties,
whose wider array of legislative and regulatory acts was
unnecessarily complex. 263 Among the six instruments, European laws
and European framework laws are classified as "legislative acts" that
are generally adopted through action involving the Commission,
Council, and European Parliament. 264 On the other hand, European
regulations and European decisions are deemed "non-legislative acts"
and may be issued, as specifically mandated in the Constitution, by
the European Council, Council, Commission, or European Central
26 5
Bank.

259.
Id. at art. V-446.
260.
See infra text accompanying notes 418-21.
261.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-33 to -44.
262.
Id. at art. 1-33(1).
263.
See EC TREATY, supra note 2, at art. 249. The Constitution's forms of
legislation are similar to the five types currently provided under Article 249 of the EC
Treaty, with the addition of "European regulations" as a new form of action. Activities
relating to the common foreign and security policy (the TEU's Second Pillar) and
cooperation and justice in home affairs (Third Pillar) are currently subject to their own
types of legislation, such as "common strategies," "joint actions," and "common
positions" in the Second Pillar, and "common positions," "framework decisions,"
"decisions," and "conventions" in the Third Pillar. TEU, supra note 2, at arts.13-15, 34.
Under the Constitution these types of legislative activities will be carried out within
the same six categories as all other forms of EU legislation. CONSTITUTION, supra note
1, at art. 1-33.
264.
CONSTITUTION, supranote 1, at art. 1-34.
265.
Id. at arts. 1-35 to -36.
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In addition to employing the six legal instruments, the EU is
authorized to engage in other types of activity. 266 For example, it
must adopt "guidelines" to assist Member States in coordinating their
economic and employment policies, '267 "define and implement a
common foreign and security policy,' 268 and "carry out actions to
support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States"
in certain areas. 26 9 Furthermore, the Commission is granted a variety
of administrative, investigative, and enforcement powers to ensure
the proper application of EU law. 270 Article 1-12 notes that specific
provisions of Part III of the Constitution contain the "scope of and
271
arrangement for" exercising the Union's competences.
Unless the Constitution specifies the type of instrument or
procedure that should be used in a particular instance, it will be left
to the EU institutions to decide what form of action to take. 272
Likewise, in the case of a European regulation, the Union institutions
must choose whether it will be "binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States," or binding simply "as to the result
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed." 273
If the latter, the national authorities are free to choose the
appropriate "form and methods" of local implementation. 274 Legal
acts of the EU must state "the reasons on which they are based" 275
276
and must be formalized and published prior to taking effect.
Member State activity. In broad terms, the Constitution expects
the Member States to "take any appropriate measure, general or
particular" to fulfill their obligations arising directly from the
Constitution or resulting from the acts of EU institutions.277 This
means that the governments of the states must cooperate with EU

266.
For a detailed analysis of the complexities reflected in the types of acts
available to the EU institutions in their legislative and regulatory activities, see
Herwig C.H. Hofmann, A Critical Analysis of the new Typology of Acts in the Draft
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE
PAPERS No. 9 (2003), at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ texte/3003-009.htm. Hofmann contends:
"The structure of the typology of acts and the allocation of decision-making procedures
is at the heart of the relation between the Member States (MS) and the EU powers." Id.
at 1.
267.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-15(1)-(2).
268.
Id. at art. 1-12(4).
269.
Id. at art. 1-12(5).
270.
See, e.g. id. at arts. III-165, 111-168 (discussing the Commission's extensive
role in enforcing EU competition law).
271.
Id. at art. 1-12(6).
272.
Id. at art. 1-38(1).
273.
Id. at art. 1-33(1).
274.
Id.
275.
Id. at art. 1-38(2).
276.
See id. at art. 1-39 (explaining the process by which European and
framework laws will enter into force).
277.
Id. at art. 1-5(2).
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institutions in their regulatory and enforcement activities.278 As
previously noted, in the case of European framework laws and certain
European regulations, implementation by the Member States is a
27 9
and in these circumstances the Member States
built-in requirement,
are free to choose the "form and methods" of how to fulfill their
28 0
The actual means of implementation will depend
responsibilities.
upon national or local law and the particular legal mandates for
national or local officials.
A further reservation in favor of the Member States is that in
cases where the Union acts to "support,coordinate or supplement the
actions of the Member States," the Constitution notes that EU
involvement will not supersede Member State competence in the
28 1
field.
3. Subject Matters for EU Activity
In addition to its general principles and procedural overview of
Union activities, Part I of the Constitution describes the basic
substantive division of responsibilities between the EU and Member
States. Part III offers even greater detail on these topics, 28 2 and the
Constitution prescribes that "[t]he scope of and arrangements for
exercising the Union's competences shall be determined by the
provisions specific to each area in Part III. ' 283 The following
discussion identifies the major areas of EU activity.
Internal market. The Constitution grants the Union exclusive
competence in common commercial policy, customs union, and
conservation of marine resources, as well as monetary policy for
Member States in the euro-zone and competition rules "necessary for
the functioning of the internal market." 284 This authority includes
activities within the EU and any external actions necessary to

278.
See, e.g. id. at arts. 111-165 to -168 (discussing the Member States'
cooperative responsibilities relating to enforcement of EU competition law). Another
example of cooperation is the use of the rules of procedure and competent authorities of
the Member States to enforce obligations imposed by EU law. See, e.g., id. at art. III401. Andreas Follesdal expresses concern about "the allocation of enforcement
authority, which is still largely left with the Member States." Follesdal, supra note 127,
at 7. Citing the current dispute over the Stability and Growth Pact, he warns that
"partial compliance may unravel trust among citizens and officials." Id.
279.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 1-33(1), 1-37.
Id. at art. 1-33(1).
280.
281.
Id. at art. 1-12(5).
282.
See id. at arts. 111-115 to -436 (Part III, titled "The Policies and Functioning
of the Union," contains two-thirds of the total text of the Constitution and incorporates
the bulk of what has been contained in the EC Treaty, including the internal market,
external action, monetary union, and EU institutional and budgetary matters).
283.
Id. at art. 1-12(6).
284.
Id. at art. 1-13(1); see also id. at arts. III-161 to -169 (detailing competition
rules).
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support the internal programs. 28 5 The EU is given "shared
competence" in managing the internal market and its "four
freedoms." 286 As previously noted, in areas of shared competence the
general principle is that the EU is free to act, while Member States
may legislate only to the extent the Union has not done so. 28 7
Member State rights are retained. The EU's mandate to establish
competition rules is specifically limited to rules "necessary for the
functioning of the internal market." 288 Furthermore, the
Constitution's prohibitions of anti-competitive behavior specifically
exempt various aids granted by Member States, such as promotion of
economic development in disadvantaged areas.28 9 The Union's
authority over monetary policy is limited to the states that have
adopted the euro,2 90 and the right of certain states to remain outside
the euro-zone represents national autonomy in a highly significant
291
sphere of activity.

The Member States are expected to take an active role in the
functioning of the internal market. 292 Furthermore,they may to some

extent limit the four freedoms. For example, the right of establishment
does not apply to activities related to a state's exercise of official
authority,293 and states may restrict the rights of nationals of other
Member States on the basis of public policy, public security, or public
health.294 Free movement of goods may also be restricted by a state on
2 95
grounds such as public morality or protection of national treasures,
and Member States may operate state monopolies "of a commercial
character."296 Where the EU seeks to encourage "approximation of
legislation" among the Member States to achieve a more successful

285.
Id. at art. 1-13(2).
286.
Id. at arts. 1-14(2)(a) (regarding shared competence in the internal market),
111-133 to -136 (regarding free movement of persons), 111-137 to -143 (regarding
freedom of establishment), 111-144 to -150 (regarding freedom to provide services), III151 to -155 (regarding free movement of goods), 111-156 to -160 (regarding free
movement of capital).
287.
Id. at art. 1-12(1).
288.
Id. at art. 1-13(1).
289.
Id. at art. 111-167.
290.
Id. at arts. 1-13(1), 111-197.
291.
See
Systems
Modelling
Ltd.,
EMUleuro FAQ, available at
http://www.sysmod.comleuro-emu.htm (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of the European Monetary Union). The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden have
opted not to adopt the euro as their national currency. Id.
292.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at arts. 111-131 to -132.
293.
Id. at art. 111-139.
294.
Id. at arts. 111-133(3), III-140(1).
295.
Id. at art. 111-154.
296.
Id. at art. III-155(1). However, Member States must adjust their state
monopolies "so as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under
which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States."

Id.
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that
internal market, the Constitution contains many safeguards
2 97

protect the power of the Member States over their domestic law.

Economic and social policy. In the broad fields of economic and
social policy, the EU's role is described in various ways. The Union
enjoys shared competence in the areas of the internal market, social
policy, economic, social and territorial cohesion, agriculture and
fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport, transEuropean networks, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice,
and common safety concerns in public health. 298 The EU is required
to adopt guidelines to assist Member States in coordinating their
economic policies 299 and their employment policies. 30 0 It is also
permitted, but not required, to "take initiatives to ensure
coordination of Member States' social policies," 30 1 and to take
"supporting, coordinating or complementary action" in matters of
human health, industry, culture, tourism, education, civil protection,
and administrative cooperation. 30 2 The Union is also empowered to
promote development in disadvantaged regions within its Member
303
States.
Member State competences. Outside the areas of the Union's
exclusive competence, the Member States retain extensive rights and
responsibilities.30 4 Supplementing the Union's mandate to ensure
coordinationof Member State economic policies, the states themselves
are required to "coordinate their economic policies within the
Union." 30 5 Member States continue to have authority to operate their

297.
Id. at arts. 111-172 to -176. In an ambitious move, the Convention proposed
a provision that would have allowed QMV voting on certain aspects of company tax law
harmonization. This was ultimately rejected by the IGC in favor of retaining the
unanimity requirement in this field. Grevi, supra note 38, at 10.
298.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-14(2). Part III of the Constitution
contains extensive provisions on these subject matters. Id. at arts. 111-177 to -184
(regarding economic policy), 111-203 to -208 (employment policy), 111-209 to -219 (social
policy), 111-220 to -224 (economic, social, and territorial cohesion), 111-225 to -232
(agriculture and fisheries), 111-233 to -234 (environment), 111-235 (consumer
protection), 111-236 to -245 (transport), 111-246 to -247 (trans-European networks), III248 to -255 (research and technological development, and space), 111-256 (energy), III278 to -285 (public health, industry, culture, tourism, education, civil protection, and
administrative cooperation).
Id. at art. 1-15(1). Greater detail on economic and employment policy is
299.
found in Part III. See id. at arts. 111-177 to -184 (economic policy), 111-203 to -208
(employment policy).
Id. at art. 1-15(2).
300.
301.
Id. at art. 1-15(3).
302.
Id. at art. 1-17. See generally id. at arts. 111-278 to -285.
Id. at arts. 111-222 to -224.
303.
Giovanni Grevi describes the EU's ability to coordinate Member State
304.
economic policies as "extremely restrictive." Grevi, supra note 38, at 7.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-15(1). Greater detail on the rights
305.
and responsibilities of the Member States regarding economic policy is found in Part
III. See, e.g., id. at arts. 111-177 to -184 (economic and monetary policy), 111-220, 111-221
(economic, social, and territorial cohesion).
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own tax systems, 30 6 although they are strictly prohibited from taxing
in a discriminatory manner307 and tax harmonization is an EU
30 8
objective.
Employment policy is a field in which the EU is granted
relatively little power. It is called upon to "ensure coordination"of the
employment policies of the Member States, 30 9 but the Union's role is
essentially limited to gathering information, making reports, and
adoptingguidelines.310 The real authority remains firmly in the hands
of the individual Member States. Social policy is treated in the same
manner, with the EU encouraging coordination and harmonization,
but with the states basically in control of their own national
3
practices. 11
Areas of shared competence in general allow Member State action
only to the extent the EU has not acted.312 However, in the areas of
research, technological development, and space, the Constitution states
that the Union's exercise of competence "may not result in Member
States being prevented from exercising theirs." 313 In other shared areas,
314
states retain significant authority.

306.
See, e.g., id. at art. III-158(1)(b) (Member States have the right to take
"requisite steps to prevent infringements of national provisions" within the sphere of
taxation.).
307.
Id. at art. 111-170.
308.
Id. at art. 111-17 1.
309.
Id. at art. 1-15(2).
310.
Id. at arts. 111-205 ("The Union shall contribute to a high level of
employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States."), 111-206(2) (Council
to adopt guidelines), 111-208 (An Employment Committee will "monitor the employment
situation and employment policies in the Union and the Member States.").
311.
Id. at arts. 111-209 to -219 (regarding social policy). Andrew Moravcsik
argues that "European social policy is more show than substance" because the EU's
fiscal resources are insufficient to allow meaningful accomplishment at the Union level.
Andrew Moravcsik, The Myth of a European "Leadership Crisis," EUROPEAN POLICY
CENTRE, Issue 11 (Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.theepc.net/en.
312.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-12(2).

313.
Id. at art. 1-14(3). In matters of technological research, Union activity is
described as "complementing the activities carried out in the Member States." Id. at
art. 111-249. In some matters of research, some Member States may not be invited to
participate. See id. at art. 111-252(2) ("In implementing the multiannual framework
programme, European laws may establish supplementary programmes involving the
participation of certain Member States only.").
314.
See, e.g., id. at art. 111-233(4) (The environment is an area of shared
competence, but Member States are permitted to conclude international agreements in
the field). Also, certain EU decisions on the environment are subject to unanimous
approval of the Council, thus affording each Member State a veto. Id. at art. 111-234(2).
Furthermore, Member States may adopt their own measures more protective of the
environment than those imposed by the Union. Id. at art. 111-234(6). In the field of
consumer protection, Member States may also impose protections more stringent than
the EU has provided. Id. at art. 111-235(4). If a trans-European transport,
telecommunication, or energy network affects the territory of a Member State, the
affected state must grant its consent. Id. at art. 111-247(2). Notwithstanding an overall
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Wherever the Union takes supporting, coordinating, or
complementary action under Article 1-17, its acts "may not entail
harmonisationof Member States' laws or regulations."315 In matters
of public health, EU action is to be complementary to national law
and must "respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the
definition of their health policy and the organisationand delivery of
health services and medical care."3 16 Likewise, regarding cultural
affairs, education, vocational training, sport, and civil protection,
Union action is complementary, with the states left as the guardiansof
their nationalpolicies in these fields.3 17 If the EU offers to assist the
Member States in improving their administrative capacity to
3 18
implement Union law, any state may decline to accept such support.
Although the principle of conferral reserves all residual
competences to the Member States, and although property ownership
laws are not included in the Constitution, Article 111-425 emphasizes
that the Member State laws on property ownership are not to be
3 19
'prejudiced"by the Constitution.
External Action. As noted earlier, the Constitution recognizes
that the European Union has responsibilities in the world, and it is
empowered to act accordingly. The Constitution requires the Union to
establish relationships with the United Nations and other
intergovernmental organizations, 320 and it is required to accede to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 321 In addition, the EU may enter
into agreements with neighboring countries to promote prosperity
and peaceful relations.3 22 It may create and implement a policy of
development cooperation and humanitarian aid, 323 and it may act in
the field of world trade (referred to in the Constitution as "common
commercial policy"). 324 With respect to the euro, the Union may enter
into exchange-rate agreements with third countries,3 25 and in certain

EU energy policy, Member States are free to choose their own energy sources. Id. at
art. 111-256(2).
315.
Id. at art. 1-12(5).
316.
Id. at art. 111-278(1), (7).
317.
Id. at arts. 111-280 to -284.
318.
Id. at art. 111-285(2).
319.
Id. at art. 111-425.
320.
Id. at art. 111-327; see also id. at art. 111-324 ("The Union may conclude an
association agreement with one or more third countries or international
organizations."), 111-303.
321.
Id. at art. 1-9(2).
322.
Id. at art. 1-57.
323.
Id. at art. 1-14(4). See generally id. at arts. 111-316 to -321 (discussing
cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid in greater detail).
324.
Id. at arts. 111-314 to -315.
325.
Id. at art. 111-326(1).
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circumstances it may adopt restrictive measures in matters of
3 26
trade.
In its external activities, the EU is to be bound by a sweeping set
of values and objectives, including promotion of peace and democracy,
protection of human rights and the environment, and respect for the
United Nations Charter.3 27 These values and objectives are to form
the basis for decisions taken by the European Council in all external
matters.32 8 International agreements concluded by the EU are
32 9
binding on its institutions and also on the Member States.
The relationship between the Union and the overseas countries
and territories affiliated with certain Member States is treated in a
separate section of the Constitution,3 3 0 but it clearly relates to the
EU's external relationships. These countries and territories are to be
"associated with the Union,"33 1 enjoying many of the benefits of the
33 2
internal market.
In addition to the foregoing matters, the EU has significant
obligations with regard to a common foreign and security policy and a
common security and defense policy. Both of these are addressed
below.
The power of the Member States. The institution of external
policies in general is to be based on European decisions taken
unanimously by the European Council.33 3 International agreements
33 4
are also subject to unanimous approval in certain circumstances.
The act of acceding to the ECHR is subject to the limitation that
accession "shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the
Constitution."335 Furthermore, the Constitution states that its own
terms must not affect treaty obligations entered into by Member States
before their accession to the EU, although such states are required to
take "appropriatesteps" to renegotiate their treaties to eliminate any
336
aspects that are incompatible with Union membership.
In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid,
the Constitutionprovides that the Union's exercise of competence "may
not result in Member States being prevented from exercising

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
treatment
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at art. 111-322(2).
Id. at art. 111-292.
Id. at art. III-293(1).
Id. at art. 111-323(2).
Id. at arts. 111-286 to -291.
Id. at art. III-286(1).
See, e.g., id. at art. 111-287 (requiring Member States to apply the same
to trade with overseas countries and territories and other Member States).
Id. at art. 111-293(1).
Id. at art. 111-325(8).
Id. at art. 1-9(2).
Id. at art. 111-435.
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theirs." 337 The policies of the EU and the states must "complement
and reinforce each other." 338 In the field of common commercial
policy, EU action must not interfere with the Constitution's internal
3 39
division of competences between the Union and the Member States.
Furthermore,certain tradepolicy decisions are subject to a unanimous
decision of the Council.340 European regulations and decisions
relating to the association of the overseas countries and territories are
341
also subject to unanimous approval by the Council.
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Constitution
grants the Union the authority to "define and implement a common
foreign and security policy." 342 This policy, corresponding to the
"Second Pillar" under the TEU, 343 will cover "all areas of foreign
policy and all questions relating to the Union's security," including
development of a defense policy, discussed below. 344 Preparation and
implementation of the CFSP will be carried out by a new official, the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will be assisted by a
European External Action Service, 345 a standing Political and
Security Committee,3 4 6 and special representatives appointed as
347
needed.
The Member States must "actively and unreservedly" support
the CFSP "in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" and refrain
from taking any action contrary to the Union's interests. 348 The states
must use their diplomatic and consular missions to cooperate with
EU officials, 34 9 and at international conferences and in international
organizations the states must coordinate their action and uphold
Union positions. 350 Furthermore, a Member State is expected to
consult with the other states, through the workings of the European
Council or Council, before "undertaking any action on the
international scene or any commitment which could affect the Union's

interests."

351

337.
Id. at art. 1-14(4). See also id. at arts. 111-317(2) (cooperation with third
countries and humanitarian aid), 111-319(3) (economic, financial, and technical
cooperation with third countries), 111-321(4) (humanitarian aid).
338.
Id. at arts. III-316(1), III-319(1).
Id. at art. 111-315(6).
339.
340.
Id. at art. 111-315(4).
341.
Id. at art. 111-291.
342.
Id. at art. 1-12(4); see also id. at arts. I-40(1)-(2) (repeating the authority as
a mandate), 111-294 to -313 (discussing this authority in greater detail).
343.
TEU, supra note 2, at arts. 11-28.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-16(1).
344.
345.
Id. at arts. 1-28(2), 111-296(3).
346.
Id. at art. 111-307.
347.
Id. at art. 111-302.
348.
Id. at arts. 1-16(2), 111-294(2).
349.
Id. at art. 111-306.
350.
Id. at art. III-305(1).
351.
Id. at art. 1-40(5).
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Cooperation and final authority. The mandate to the Union is
based not on the relinquishment of Member State competence on
matters of foreign and security policy, but on "the development of
mutual political solidarity among Member States . . . and the
achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member
States' actions."352 The EU will conduct its policy by defining
guidelines and adopting European decisions, but also by
"strengtheningsystematic cooperation between Member States in the
conduct of policy. ' 353 Union officials are required to "work in
' 354
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States,
and pursuit of the CFSP will be undertakenjointly by the EU and the
35 5
states, "using nationaland Union resources."
Implementation of the CFSP may not affect the EU and Member
3 56
State competences as delineated in Part I of the Constitution.
Moreover, despite the goal of a common policy, it is the states that
continue to have the last word in this area. The general requirement
for determination of EU policy is a European decision adopted
unanimously by the European Council and Council.357 Even where the
Council has been granted the authority to take decisions by qualified
majority vote, a Member State may block Council action on the
grounds of "vital and stated reasons of national policy." 358
Furthermore,in cases of "imperative need," and where the EU has not
359
been able to act, a state may take its own action.
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). One stated goal of
the common foreign and security policy, also found within the TEU's
Second Pillar, is the "progressive framing of a common defence
policy," 360 and the Union is granted competence in this field. 361 The
EU is to seek an "operational capacity drawing on assets civil and
military" and use its assets outside the Union for peace-keeping
"

352.
Id. at art. 1-40(1).
353.
Id. at art. 111-294(3).
354.
Id. at art. 111-296(3); see also id. at art. 111-301 (providing that the Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States
shall coordinate their activities).
355.
Id. at art. 1-40(4).
356.
Id. at art. 111-308.
357.
Id. at arts. 1-40(7), III-300(1); see id. at art. 111-325(8) (providing that
decisions to conclude agreements between the EU and neighboring states may also
require unanimity in some circumstances). Note, however, that the European Council
may unanimously decide that certain decisions relating to the CFSP may be taken by
the Council by qualified majority vote. Id. at arts. 1-40(8), 111-300(3).
358.
Id. at art. 111-300(2).
359.
Id. at art. 111-297(4).
360.
Id. at art. 1-12(4); see TEU, supra note 2, at art. 17 (regarding the scope of
the common foreign and security policy). See generally CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at
arts. 111-309 to -312.
361.
Id. at art. 1-16(1).
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missions, conflict prevention, 362 and combating terrorism. 36 3 A
European Armaments, Research, and Military Capabilities Agency
will be established to develop information and generally promote the
36 4
CSDP.
Unanimity; Member State action. Despite the stated intention of
developing a common policy, the Constitution repeatedly emphasizes
the defense needs of the individual Member States,365 and it leaves
ultimate power in this field in the hands of the Member States. If a
state becomes a victim of armed aggression, the other states must
provide "aidand assistance by all the means in their power." 366 The
Union and the states are required to "actjointly" to assist a state that
has been subject to a terroristattack, and the military resources to be
used will be those "made available by the Member States."3 67 The
CSDP and any other provisions of the Constitution may not restrict
any Member State from preserving secrecy vital to its security or from
taking "such steps as it considers necessary for the protection of the
essential interests of its security which are connected with the
36 8
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material."
Defense policies of "certainMember States," whether acting in NATO
369
or otherwise, are not to be prejudiced by the CSDP.
Most important,
decisions on the common policy are to be taken unanimously by the
Council,37 0 and the actual creationof a common defense is subject to a
371
consensus vote of the European Council.
There is considerable emphasis on the fact that military resources
will remain in the hands of the Member States, who are urged to
37 2
progressively improve their individual military capabilities.
Even
in the case of a unanimous decision taken at the EU level, it is state
assets that will be used,3 73 and the Constitution contemplates
374
assigning the execution of an agreed task to a group of states.
Likewise, there are mechanisms created for "permanent structured

362.
Id. at art. 1-41(1).
363.
Id. at art. III-309(1).
364.
Id. at arts. 1-41(3), 111-311.
365.
Id. at art. 1-41(2).
366.
Id. at art. 1-41(7). It is of interest that the "aid and assistance" obligation is
tied to the requirements of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter rather than to a
new tenet of EU law. Also, action in this area must be consistent with Member States'
NATO obligations, which are described as "the foundation for their collective defence
and the forum for its implementation." Id.
367.
Id. at art. 1-43; see also id. at art. 111-329 (further details on support for a
Member State).
368.
Id. at art. III-436(1).
369.
Id. at art. 1-41(2).
370.
Id. at art. 1-41(4).
371.
Id. at art. 1-41(2).
372.
Id. at art. 1-41(3).
373.
Id.
374.
Id. at arts. 1-41(5), 111-310.
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cooperation" among groups of Member States that might act on the
Union's behalf.375 Furthermore,a Member State's participationin the
376
EuropeanAgency is optional.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Another goal
delineated in the Constitution is the creation of "an area of freedom,
security and justice" within the European Union. 37 7 This was the
essence of the TEU's "Third Pillar," 378 and the Constitution permits
the Council to establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office 379 and
develop policies on border control, asylum, immigration, and judicial,
and police cooperation. 380 The Constitution includes the AFSJ in the
38
EU's areas of shared competence. '
Member State authority reserved. The EU is permitted to legislate
and develop policies on the AFSJ, but considerable deference is paid to
the Member States. The Constitution speaks of the Union developing
"strategic guidelines'3 8 2 while respecting the principle of
38 3
subsidiarity.
While EU legislation is possible, greater emphasis is
placed on developing "mutual confidence" and "cooperation"among
the Member States, than on creation of a comprehensive, centralized
body of law. 38 4 Union action must take into account "the different legal
traditions and systems of the Member States." 38 5 EU efforts may not
affect the ultimate responsibility of each state "with regard to
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal
security." 386
In matters of border checks, asylum and immigration,
notwithstanding any policies developed by the Union, Member States
retain the competence to determine the "geographical demarcation of
their borders, in accordance with international law"38 7 and to
determine the number of third country nationals to be permitted to
enter and seek work.3 88 In the field of judicial cooperation in civil
matters, the EU may develop laws or framework laws, but any policies

375.
Id. at arts. 1-41(6), 111-312.
376.
Id. at art. 111-311(2).
377.
Id. at art. 1-42.
378.
TEU, supranote 2, at arts. 29-42.
379.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-274(1) (requiring the Council
decision to be taken unanimously). In addition, the European Council may, by
unanimous vote, extend the powers of the Prosecutor. Id. at art. 111-274(4).
380.
Id. at art. III-257(2)-(3). See generally id. at arts. 111-257 to -277 (detailing
the subject areas of the AFSJ).
381.
Id. at art. 1-14(2).
382.
Id. at art. 111-258.
383.
Id. at art. 111-259.
384.
Id. at arts. 1-42(1), 111-260 to -261.
385.
Id. at art. III-257(1).
386.
Id. at art. 111-262.
387.
Id. at art. 111-265(3).
388.
Id. at art. 111-267(5).
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affecting family law must be unanimously adopted by the Council.38 9
With regard to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, certain Union
acts must receive unanimous approval on the Council.390 Furthermore,
a Member State which believes that a Europeanframework law under
considerationby the Council (which would eventually make a decision
by QMV) might "affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice
system" can force the proposal to be referred to the European Council,
where unanimous approval will be required.3 91 Also, Member States
in some instances may adopt higher levels of protection of individual
rights than are mandated by the Union,392 and EU law promoting
crime prevention may not require approximationof state laws. 393 Last,
EU laws regarding cross-border police cooperation are subject to
394
unanimous vote on the Council.
Nationalparliamentsare specifically empowered to participatein
evaluating the Union's -efforts in the AFSJ.395 Also, in one of the
relatively rare instances in which the proposing of EU legislation is
not reserved to the Commission, Union acts pertaining to judicial or
police cooperation may be initiated by one-fourth of the Member
396
States.
D. Five Remarkable Provisions
This Article has focused on how the Constitution structures the
European Union, establishes its institutions, and defines its areas of
activity, all of which are subject to restrictions on the EU and
reservations in favor of the Member States. Among the Constitution's
many provisions mentioned in this analysis, five deserve additional
attention, because each of the five in its own unique way offers a
powerful statement on the status of Member States within the Union.
Article 1-5: Respect. The EU is required to "respect the equality of
the Member States before the Constitution as well as their national
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional,inclusive of regionaland local self-government."3 97 The
Union must "respect their essential state functions, including ensuring

389.
Id. at art. 111-269(3).
390.
Id. at arts. III-271(1) (regarding expanding the list of serious cross-border
crimes), III-274(1) (establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office).
391.
Id. at arts. 111-270(3), 111-271(3). This procedure in the AFSJ realm has
been referred to as an "emergency brake." Grevi, supra note 38, at 7 (discussing art.
111-270(3), previously numbered art. 111-170(3)).
392.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-270(2).
393.
Id. at art. 111-272.
394.
Id. at arts. 111-275(3), 111-277.
395.
Id. at arts. 111-259 to -261.
396.
Id. at arts. 1-34(3), 1-42(3), 111-264.
397.
Id. at art. 1-5(1); see TEU, supra note 2, at art. 6(3) (detailing a similar but
less elaborate provision requiring the Union to respect Member State identities).
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the territorialintegrity of the state, maintaining law and order and
safeguarding national security."' 398 The EU and the Member States
are mandated to treat each other with "full mutual respect." 3 99 These
instructions to the EU are clearly intended to prohibit a hegemonic
relationship. They prescribe a partnership in which the central
authority will carry out a necessary coordinating function without
assertingcomplete dominance.
Article 1-44: Enhanced cooperation. Article 1-44 follows the
precedent of the EC Treaty and TEU by permitting groups of Member
States to engage in "enhanced cooperation"in areas where the Council
has determined that the Union as a whole cannot be expected to
participate.400 Although there are demanding criteria to be met before
a plan of enhanced cooperationmay be undertaken,40 1 once the process
has been approved the participatingstates may make use of the EU
40 2
institutions to implement the program.
However useful, enhanced cooperation is uncharacteristic of a
true federal system in which powers are divided vertically between the
central government on the one hand and the states on the other.40 3 In a
federation, critical matters of policy are determined centrally and are
applicable throughout the system. If there is insufficient support for a
policy at the federal level, either no action will be taken or, at best,
separate action might be taken at the state level, but groups of states
will not undertake to do together what the central government could
not accomplish. Group action through enhanced cooperation reveals a

398.

CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-5(1).

Id. at art. 1-5(2).
399.
Id. at arts. 1-44, 111-416 to -423; see EC TREATY, supra note 2, at arts. 11400.
lla (identifying requirements to establish enhanced cooperation between Member
States); TEU, supra note 2, at arts. 43-45; see also Dougan, supra note 222, at 12-13
(analyzing the Constitution's changes to the enhanced cooperation procedures).
401.
Enhanced cooperation may be undertaken only in areas outside the EU's
exclusive competence and only as a "last resort" if Union-wide action is not feasible.
The cooperative activity may not undermine the internal market, cause any
discrimination in trade within the EU, distort competition, or interfere with the rights
of non-participating Member States. Further restrictions include a requirement that
one-third of the Member States must participate, that any other Member State may
join the cooperation at any subsequent time, and that the activity must "further the
objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process."
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-44. See also id. at arts. 111-416 to -417.
Id. at art. 1-44(1). A concept related to enhanced cooperation is the
402.
requirement that certain Member States with superior military capabilities must
engage in "structured cooperation" in connection with the EU's common security and
defense policy. Id. at art. 1-41(6). Provisions relating to enhanced cooperation are
applicable to structured cooperation, including the right of a Member State initially
outside the program to subscribe at a later date. Id. at art. 111-312(3). One further
example of the EU's tolerance for special relationships among its Member States is the
Constitution's explicit permission for continued "regional unions" among the Benelux
countries. Id. at art. IV-441.
403.
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lack of collective will to maintain policy consistency within the EU. If
utilized to any significant extent, the cooperationprocedure will result
in a multi-track Union that tolerates varying levels of commitment
40 4
from its Member States.
Article 1-59: Suspension of rights. The amenability of Member
States to suits and judgments in the EU courts is a manifestation of
power vested in the central authority,40 5 and this phenomenon would
be expected in a strong federal system. The European Union, however,
has a separate procedure that is decidedly un-federal. The
Constitutionprovides that the European Council may, after complying
with strict procedures, determine that a Member State has committed
a "seriousand persistent breach"of the EU's core values.40 6 Upon such
a determination, the Council may suspend certain of the violating
state's rights under the Constitution, including its voting rights within
the Council.40 7 Despite such a suspension, the state in question will
408
"continueto be bound by its obligations under the Constitution."
Suspension of the voting rights of a state within a multi-state
system is problematic for two principal reasons. First, it reveals an
inherent weakness on the part of the centralgovernment-the inability
to engage the coercive tools necessary to impose its will on the state
officials responsible for the violation. Second, it effectively

404.
It might well be noted that the EU is already a two-track system with
regard to monetary policy, in which the Union permits several Member States to
remain outside the euro-zone. However, this policy is not being carried out under the
existing enhanced cooperation provisions in the EC Treaty. See Franklin Dehousse et
al., Integrating Europe: Multiple speeds-One direction?, EPC WORKING PAPER No. 9
(April 2004), available at http://www.epin.org/pdf/CoussensIRRI-KIIB160404.pdf
(providing a detailed review of "flexible integration" within the EU, both as to
historical experiences and future possibilities); see also Joschka Fischer, From
Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration, Speech
at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 9-12 (May 12, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/redene/r00512br1008e.pdf) (outlining an integrationist's perspective on the value of enhanced
cooperation).
405.
The ECJ is granted jurisdiction to hear cases in which a Member State is
accused of failing "to fulfil an obligation under the Constitution." CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, at arts. 111-360 to -361. Such cases may be brought by the Commission or
another Member State, and the ECJ has the authority to impose financial penalties or
order the defendant state to comply with the Court's decision. Id. at arts. 111-360 to 362.
406.
Id. at art. 1-59(2). The values are those expressed in Article 1-2, namely,
"respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." Id. at art. 1-2.
The procedures include a preliminary determination by the Council and the consent of
the European Parliament. Id. at arts. I-59(1)-(2). The decision by the European Council
must be unanimous, with the accused Member State ineligible to vote on the matter.
Id. at arts. 1-59(2), (5).
407.
Id. at art. 1-59(3). Similar provisions for the suspension of rights are
contained in the Treaties. TEU, supra note 2, at art. 7; EC TREATY, supra note 2, at
art. 309.
408.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-59(3).
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disenfranchises the citizens of that state, because their state
government is rendered incapable of fully representing them at the
central level.40 9 In actuality, suspension of rights is akin to a
countermeasure imposed by treaty partners on a state that has
breached its treaty obligations. Lacking a strong central authority, the
aggrieved states may have no choice but to reciprocate by denying the
violating state the benefit of the treaty relationship.4 10 The
underpinnings of countermeasures are twofold: the sovereignty of the
violating state and the corresponding inability of the other states to
enforce treaty compliance. From this point of view, Article 1-59 tacitly
recognizes that the Member States are sovereign entities within the
Union, and in their sovereignty they may be immune to centrally
imposed enforcement of their core responsibilities.
Article 1-60: Withdrawal from the Union. Part I of the
Constitution presents an overview of the European Union, a kind of
promotional summary of its values and objectives, its competences, the
authority of its institutions, the rights of its citizens, and the
commitment of the Member States to its success. Ironically, after all of
that, the final provision of PartI creates the right of a Member State to
voluntarily withdraw from the Union.411 This is a procedure not found
in the Treaties. Article 1-60 calls for notification by the withdrawing
state, negotiation of a withdrawal agreement, and an exit date two
years after first notification is given to the EU unless the parties agree
otherwise.4 12 A state that has withdrawn may later apply to rejoin the
4 13
Unionpursuant to the ordinaryaccessionprocedure.
Secession of a constituent part from a federation, as the U.S. Civil
War demonstrated, is a threat to the very existence of the federal entity
and is generally considered to be illegal.414 On the other hand, despite

409.
Anticipating such fallout, the Constitution provides that "the Council shall
take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on the rights and
obligations of natural and legal persons." Id.
410.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 346. Notwithstanding the possibility of suspension of a Member State's voting
rights, Joseph Weiler has argued that legal remedies available within the EU have
largely eliminated "the most central legal artifact of international law: the notion (and
doctrinal apparatus) of exclusive state responsibility with its concomitant principles of
reciprocity and counter-measures." J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do
THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 29 (1999).
411.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 1-60.
412.
Id. at art. 1-60(2)-(3).

413.
Id. at art. 1-60(5); see also id. at art. 1-58 (regarding accession procedures).
414.
The United States Supreme Court has decreed secession to be in violation
of American federal law. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724-26 (1868). Joseph Weiler has
noted the "juridical" conclusion that under the current Treaties unilateral withdrawal
from European Union would be illegal. WEILER, supra note 410, at 18. Cass Sunstein
argues that provisions permitting secession may well endanger "ordinary democratic
processes" and that they have no place in a constitution. Cass Sunstein,
Constitutionalismand Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 669-70 (1991).
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the rule of pacta sunt servanda-the expectation that a state will fulfill
its treaty obligations4 15-international law recognizes a variety of
groundsfor revoking and withdrawing from a treaty.4 16 Under the law
of treaties the concept of state sovereignty would allow withdrawal
either in accordance with the terms of the treaty itself or on the basis of
an ultimate expression of self-interest. The Constitution's inclusion of
Article 1-60 underscores the fact that in many ways it is still a
treaty-its parties, the Member States, may assert their autonomy by
417
withdrawing from the Union.
Article IV-443: Amending the Constitution. The ordinary
procedure for amendments to the Constitution requires either a
constitutional convention or an IGC, plus ratification by all of the
Member States, acting in accordance with their own constitutional
requirements.418 There are also two "simplified" amendment
procedures relating to Part III of the Constitution. Under the first,
unanimous voting requirements in Part III can be changed to QMV,
and special legislative procedures in Part III can be replaced with the
ordinary procedure, without the necessity of a convention or IGC.
However, the European Council must unanimously approve any such
amendment, and it must be referred to the national parliaments.
Opposition by any parliament will block the amendment.4 19 The

415.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 410, at 332; IAN
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF TREATIES 84 (2d ed. 1984).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 410, at 344-47; see
416.
SINCLAIR, supranote 415, at 181.
417.
Raymond Friel sees secession as a distinctly anti-federal concept, and he
writes: 'The degree to which secession is controlled tells us much about whether the
Union is simply an association of States or a true federal Union." Raymond Friel, The
Draft Constitution:Issues and Analyses: Secession from the European Union: Checking
out of the Proverbial "CockroachMotel," 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 590, 641 (2004); see also
Dougan, supra note 222, at 8 (discussing art. 1-60, previously numbered 1-59, as "the
ultimate constraint upon Union competence").
418.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. IV-443(2)-(3). Herwig C.H. Hofmann
has commented that the ratification requirement relating to constitutional
amendments "can be regarded as the last direct link between EU law and public
international law principles. A strong intergovernmental aspect accompanies it."
Hofmann, supra note 266, at 18. As noted earlier, the intergovernmental school of
thought emphasizes ultimate Member State power. See supra Part I.
419.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. IV-444. Commenting on this procedure,
Giovanni Grevi has written: "[c]onsidering the sometimes twisted dynamics of national
politics in relation to Europe, this is absurd and seriously undermines the effectiveness
of a very important procedure, allowing for a minimal degree of flexibility to overcome
unanimity." Grevi, supra note 38, at 7. It is of interest that there is one streamlined
amendment procedure that avoids referral to national parliaments or Member State
ratification: Article 111-422 permits the Council representatives of Member States
participating in a program of enhanced cooperation to unanimously decide to move
from unanimity to QMV or from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary
procedure. The European Parliament must be consulted on a change of legislative
procedure, but the national parliaments and Member State governments have no role
in either process. CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 111-422.
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second procedurepermits revisions to Title III of PartIII (the internal
policies of the Union) without a convention or IGC, but a unanimous
decision of the European Council is required, and the amendment is
subject to ratification by all of the Member States.420 Regardless of
which amendment procedure is followed, any formal change in the
competences of the Union and its institutions will be subject to
procedural safeguards and full consensus. 42 1 The majoritarian ideal
yields to the ultimate power of the veto and the absolute right of each
state to preserve what it has previously agreed to, including the
Constitution's careful balancing of authority. The unanimity
requirement protects each state from the unwanted imposition of an
ultimate loss of sovereignty.

III. CONCLUSION: A FINAL BALANCING
A question never far from the minds of those who follow Union
developments is, "Will the Creation come to dominate its Creators?"
Federalists
might
answer,
"It
must,
and
it
will."
Intergovernmentalists would counter, "No, never." Confederalists
could raise their hands and urge, "Stop! There is a middle ground,
and we are standing on it. The European Union can be a significant
force in Europe and the world, but the Member States need not slide
into oblivion or irrelevance."
The intergovernmental and federal camps are entitled to press
their opposing points of view, but this Article has demonstrated that
the Constitution will maintain the EU as a hybrid system. The Union
will continue to possess competences considerably more sweeping
than those granted to a typical IGO, but it will stop far short of
becoming a true federation. The following is a brief summary of the
Constitution's salient provisions relating to its allocation of powers.
A. Emphasis on the Union
Many, but not all, of the central features assigned to the Union
under the Constitution will be carryovers from the treaties. Whether
presently existing or not, the Constitution will endow the EU with
the following striking characteristics:
Citizenship. EU citizenship is granted to nationals of the
Member States, affording them the freedom to reside, work, and vote
anywhere in the Union.

420.
Id. at art. IV-445(1)-(2).
421.
Several attempts were made at the Convention to permit constitutional
amendments by less than unanimous approval, but these were rebuffed. See NORMAN,
supra note 7, at 81, 293, 332.
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Budgetary independence. The EU raises its own revenue and
sets its own budgets. It does not depend on contributions from its
members.
The euro. The EU has its own currency, managed by its own
central bank.
European Parliament. An increasingly important institution, the
Parliament is popularly elected and not answerable to the Member
State governments. Its role in the Union's legislative process, while
limited in some respects, is significant.
Council of Ministers. Its members represent the national
governments, but much of its decision-making is by qualified
majority.
Commission. Under the Constitution, the EU's permanent
executive will as of 2014 no longer be composed of voting
commissioners from all Member States, and the Commission will
retain its independence.
Majoritarian principles. A considerable amount of Union
legislation may be adopted by majority voting in the Council and
European Parliament.
Primacy. EU law has primacy over the laws of all Member
States, including those that might have opposed the EU action.
B. Emphasis on the Member States
The text of the Constitution is replete with language that speaks
to the Member States' integrity and competence within the EU system.
A few of the most significant concepts are:
Conferral. The EU may act in many fields, but only within the
limits of authority conferred on it by the Member States. Competences
not granted to the Union under the Constitution remain with the
states.
Unanimous voting. The general requirement for policy-setting on
the European Council is unanimity, and the Council must reach
consensus on many of its key decisions. Unanimity is distinctly antimajoritarian,and a single Member State can block a decision or exact
concessions as the price for its vote. To avoid gridlock, reservations
and opt-outs may be necessary.
Foreign policy and defense. Activity in these critical areas, which
could be employed to enhance the Union's stature as a world power, is
largely left to the Member States.
Respect for the states. In its own Constitution the Union is
mandated to respect the integrity of the Member States as sovereign
nations.
Enhanced cooperation. Where the EU is unable to act, groups of
states may proceed to act on their own. This is evidence of a certain
weakness at the central level and a certain measure of autonomy left
in the Member States.
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Suspension of rigahts. This provision underscores the fact that the
Constitution retains many characteristicsof a treaty.
Withdrawal right. This is a singular concept. Although the
economic and political ramificationsof withdrawal will likely inhibit
this provisionfrom ever being invoked, its presence in the Constitution
is a bold affirmation of ultimate nationalsovereignty.
Unanimity to amend. The Constitution cannot be amended
without the consent of each Member State.
C. Holding the Middle Ground
Given the constantly shifting winds of global affairs, regional
politics, and national sentiment, it is impossible to predict whether
the Constitution, if indeed ratified, will yield success for the
European Union. Will its balance of power be workable? Can its
political compromises be sustained? Will there be continuing pressure
to hand more power to Brussels, or will there be a drift toward
enhanced cooperation among a core group of states? What is clear is
that the Constitution is intended to maintain the Union's current
system of dual authority, with the Member States retaining their
status as sovereign nations in a union with significant central
features. Under the Constitution the middle ground between
intergovernmentalism and federalism will be held.

